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Visual Evidence and the Law
in Call Northside 777
Jennifer L. Mnookin* and Nancy West**
The year was 1932. Crime in Chicago had increased sharply during
Prohibition, and the city denizens were anxious. On a cold and blustery
Friday afternoon in December, two men entered a speakeasy and held its
owner up at gunpoint.' Shots were fired, and a policeman who happened
to be present ended up dead-the eighth Chicago policeman to suffer a
violent end that year.2 Another policeman murdered in broad daylight and
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assistance.
** Associate Professor, Victorian and Cultural Studies, University of Missouri-Columbia. Thanks
to Penelope Pelizzon and Sandy Camargo for reading drafts of this Article.
1. People v. Majczek, 195 N.E. 653,654 (111. 1935).
2. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Is He Guilty? Would You Convict Joe Majczek? Here's the
Story Behind Slaying of Policeman, CHI. DAILY TIMES, Nov. 27, 1944, at 3.
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in cold blood? It was important that the public believe that the forces of
law and order were still in control of the city.3 The police force and the
residents of the city were hungry for justice, or at least vengeance.4 A
Polish immigrant named Joseph Majczek was soon arrested for the
murder, and a month later a co-conspirator was also charged.5 After an
uneventful trial, they were both convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to ninety-nine years in the Illinois State Prison.6 On appeal,
their convictions were upheld.7 Case solved and case closed, or so it
seemed. A short-lived blip on the front pages of the newspapers, this
particular cop-killing was relegated to yesterday's headlines, the murder
and the trial completely forgotten, at least in the popular imagination.
Eleven years later, however, the case became news once again. The
convicted murderer's mother placed a classified ad in the Chicago Daily
Times, offering a reward of $5000 to anyone with information that could
help set her son free.8 The ad caught the eye of a Times reporter, who,
thinking there might be a "human interest" story in it, passed it to an editor
who then assigned it to two members of his staff.9 These reporters
published a series of investigative articles that generated widespread
sympathy for Majczek and eventually led to his release and pardon. 0 In
1948, the case was revisited again, this time by Twentieth-Century Fox in
a film named Call Northside 777,"1 directed by Henry Hathaway and
featuring James Stewart as an investigative reporter named P.J. McNeal,
and Richard Conte as Frank Wiecek, the character based on Joseph
Majczek. 12
3. See National Affairs: Illinois, TIME, Aug. 17, 1945, at 23 ("Mayor Anton Cermak, who was
trying to get Chicago's mildewed reputation scrubbed up for the World's Fair, clamored for a crime
cleanup.").
4. As McPhaul and McGuire wrote, "The period was one in which civic groups and newsgroups
were agitated over a 'crime wave,' and the local papers were even publishing a 'daily score' on the
state's attorney's accomplishments." McPhaul & McGuire, supra note 2, at 3; see also JOHN J.
MCPHAUL, DEADLINES AND MONKEYSHINES: THE FABLED WORLD OF CHICAGO JOURNALISM 195
(1962) (describing how the mayor had ordered a no-holds barred "war on crime" in an effort to clean
up the city for the upcoming Century of Progress Exposition).
5. Majczek, 195 N.E. at 655.
6. Id. at 654.
7. Id
8. CHI. DAILY TIMES, Oct. 10, 1944, at 30. The ad read in full: "$5000 Reward for killers of
Officer Lundy on Dec. 9, 1932. Call Gro, 1758 12-7 p.m."Id.
9. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Trial Witness Insists Identification False, CHI. DAILY TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1944, at 3; see also MCPHAUL, supra note 4, at 191.
10. The series of articles began on November 27, 1944, and ran daily until December 5, 1944.
The Times continued to cover the case extensively through Majczek's eventual pardon on August 15,
1945.
11. CALL NORTHSIDE 777 (Twentieth-Century Fox 1948) [hereinafter Northside].
12. During the 1940s and 1950s, Twentieth-Century Fox produced roughly thirty percent of all
films now classified as "film noir" and nearly eighty percent of all films now classified as "noir
documentaries," Northside among them. See ALAIN SILVER & ELIZABETH WARD, FILM NOIR: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIC REFERENCE TO THE AMERICAN STYLE 5 (1979). Other film noir titles produced by
[Vol. 13:329
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From a murder trial to a three-line advertisement to a Hollywood feature
film: the trajectory of the Majczek case involves an explosion of
narratives, each acquiring a greater mass audience than the one preceding
it. This Article will focus on the film version, but we analyze the film in
relation to the narratives that preceded, inspired, and shaped it-both the
trial itself and the newspaper accounts that led to Majczek's freedom. For
as we shall show, the film offers a sharp critique of legal rules of
evidence, a critique that can best be understood in relation to the evidence
presented in the actual Majczek trial. Moreover, through the vehicle of one
particular wrongful conviction, the film attempts to tell a grander story of
the power of mass media as a protector of freedoms and the righter of
legal wrongs-just as the Chicago Daily Times's articles ended up not
only freeing Majczek but winning awards for revealing the life-changing
power of journalism at its best.
13
Though it was both popular and critically acclaimed at the time of its
release, Call Northside 777 is no longer much remembered. 4 Today, it is
typically a film consigned to a footnote in film history, not a minor film,
but not a major one either.'5 It enjoyed substantial popularity on its
release, and it features one of Hollywood's most beloved actors; however,
while Northside is available for rental at many video stores, it remains at
Fox include John Brahm's THE BRASHER DOUBLOON (Twentieth-Century Fox 1947), Henry
Hathaway's THE DARK CORNER (Twentieth-Century Fox 1946), Otto Preminger's FALLEN ANGEL
(Twentieth-Century Fox 1946), and LAURA (Twentieth-Century Fox 1944). For titles of noir
documentaries produced by Twentieth-Century Fox, see infra note 16.
With directors like Preminger, Hathaway, and Robert Siodmak under contract, Twentieth-Century
Fox could claim film noir and the noir documentary as being among its specializations. (Indeed, in a
review of Northside, Time magazine called the studio "the leader" in making what it called "semi-
documentary" films. New Picture: Call Northside 777, TIME, Feb. 16, 1948, at 99.) A relatively small
studio compared to MGM or Paramount, Twentieth-Century Fox specialized in less popular and more
"artsy" genres (as did RKO and Warner Bros.) rather than the big-budget musicals, dramas, and
comedies that made the other studios so powerful. For discussion of the Hollywood studios and the
types of films they made, see generally THOMAS SCHATZ, THE GENIUS OF THE SYSTEM: HOLLYWOOD
FILMMAKING IN THE STUDIO ERA (1988).
13. McPhaul and McGuire won the annual Heywood Broun Award of the American Newspaper
Guild for their reporting. MCPHAUL, supra note 4, between 180-81 (reprinting a photograph of the
Heywood Broun Award at a Chicago Newspaper Guild ball in 1945). They also won several other
awards, including one from the national journalism fraternity, Sigma Delta Chi, and one from the
National Headliners Club. See Gary Houston, A Real Life Chicago Murder Mystery: Few Stories
Compare with "Northside 777, " CHI. TRiB., Jan. 9, 1995, at C1.
14. The L.A. Times, for example, called it "engrossing cinema[,] ... a film triumph." Time
magazine called it "a good answer to those who generalize too glibly about the superiority of
European movies." New Picture: Call Northside 777, supra note 12, at 100.
15. In comparison to other films starring James Stewart, particularly those directed by Frank
Capra and Alfred Hitchcock, Call Northside 777 has received scant popular or critical attention. More
generally, Henry Hathaway has never enjoyed the kind of critical attention devoted to many other
American directors. Despite a prolific career (he made sixty-one films between 1932 and 1971) and
the critical and commercial success of many of his films, e.g., KISS OF DEATH (Twentieth-Century Fox
1947); How THE WEST WAS WON (MGM 1963); TRUE GRIT (Paramount 1969), no scholarly book-
length study exists on Hathaway, and the Academy nominated him only once for Best Director-for
LIVES OF A BENGAL LANCER (Paramount 1935). See EMANUEL LEVY, AND THE WINNER IS... : THE
HISTORY AND POLITICS OF THE OSCAR AWARDS 170 (1987).
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best only vaguely familiar to most moviegoers. Scholars have paid
Northside some limited attention, focusing primarily on its relation to film
noir. 6 But no full-length articles exist on Northside, and the rare
discussions of it in film criticism are usually limited to a mere paragraph
or two.17 What, then, justifies this Article? Is Northside worth so many
16. The three authors who engage with Call Northside 777 in most detail are film theorists J.P.
Telotte and Frank Krutnik, and legal historian Norman Rosenberg. Rosenberg offers a rich analysis of
Northside's themes, and he is the only author to date who emphasizes the ways that Northside
represents "the law" as an institution. Norman Rosenberg, Law Noir, in LEGAL REELISM: MOVIES AS
LEGAL TEXT 281-89 (John Denvir ed., 1996) [hereinafter LEGAL REELISM]. Ironically, given his focus
on law, Rosenberg affords no time to Northside's exploration of legal evidence, which is our primary
focus.
Telotte and Krutinik both concem themselves with locating Call Northside 777 within traditional
film genres, making the case for the film as a "documentary noir," a hybrid of the film noir and the
documentary traditions. See J.P. TELOTTE, VOICES IN THE DARK: NARRATIVE PATTERNS IN FILM NOIR
134-35 (1989); FRANK KRUTNIK, IN A LONELY STREET: FILM NOIR, GENRE AND MASCULINITY 202-
08 (1991). They identify the film as part of an impressive cycle of movies produced roughly between
1945 and 1950 that purported to offer realistic and objective accounts of urban crime. Also described
as "semi-documentary crime thrillers," this cycle of films includes other Twentieth-Century Fox
productions like Hathaway's THE HOUSE ON 92ND STREET (Twentieth-Century Fox 1945) and 13 RUE
MADELEINE (Twentieth-Century Fox 1946), and Elia Kazan's BOOMERANG (Twentieth-Century Fox
1947). Other titles in this cycle include Jules Dassin's THE NAKED CITY (Universal Pictures 1948),
Anthony Mann's T-MEN (Eagle Lion Films 1948) and BORDER INCIDENT (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1949), Alfred Walker's HE WALKED BY NIGHT (Bryan Foy Productions 1949), Maxwell Shane's CITY
ACROSS THE RIVER (Universal-International 1949), George Sherman's THE SLEEPING CITY
(Universal-International 1950), and John H. Auer's THE CITY THAT NEVER SLEEPS (Republic 1953).
As an attempt to situate the film historically, grouping Northside this way makes sense. Like the
other films, Northside proposed to offer American audiences something different from the Hollywood
fare they had been fed on before the war, something as socially charged and informative as the popular
newsreel The March of Time, which the American public watched in theaters nationwide during the
war. Like these films, March employed a stentorian voice-over, actual footage, and, as Bosley
Crowther once remarked, "the reenactment of an event so effective that it simulates reality itself."
Bosley Crowther, Imitations Unwanted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1948, at B1, quoted in TELOTTE, supra,
at 135. Aesthetically and methodologically, Northside also has much in common with these films.
What they share, as Telotte puts it, is their "consistent and calculated slippage from a documentary
'look,"' their deliberate flirtation with the supposed boundaries between Hollywood fiction and
documentary. TELOTTE, supra at 136.
However, the term "documentary noir" presupposes a hard-edged, even cynical, treatment of its
subject, which Northside does not offer. The film is too optimistic, too univocal, and too confident
about the possibilities for justice to fit comfortably in the category "noir." And although Northside
possesses important documentary characteristics, some of which we will discuss later, it participates
less in the documentary tradition than these other films, which generally cast unknown performers and
paid much less attention than Northside to such elements as dramatic conflict and narrative closure.
Northside is at once much more Hollywoodish and, in a sense, more historically accurate than most of
these other films. Elia Kazan's Boomerang is perhaps the film with which Northside shares the
greatest affinity: Like Northside, Boomerang is closely based on an actual murder case; it mixes
elements of classical narrative with documentary techniques; and it concerns itself with questions
about witnessing, testimony, and the sufficiency of legal evidence. Although Boomerang was released
on video, it was released in a limited press and is not widely available to viewers at present.
17. Beyond the three authors discussed above, see supra note 16, the area of film scholarship that
has produced the most commentary on Northside is noir studies, which generally upholds the film as
marking an important contribution to the genre. It is featured, for example, in Silver and Ward's
encyclopedia on film noir, where it is described as a "fine example of what might be called
Inewspaper noir."' SILVER & WARD, supra note 12, at 49-50. Stuart Kaminsky includes it as one of
121 "key" film noirs in a list he compiled. STUART KAMINSKY, AMERICAN FILM GENRES 274 (1985).
Still, most critics afford it only very brief discussion, no doubt because it lacks so many of noir's
typical characteristics. See, e.g., NICHOLAS CHRISTOPHER, SOMEWHERE IN THE NIGHT 15, 44, 52, 91,
4




We will argue that Northside can be read as a study in evidence. It is a
film that speaks powerfully to the question of what counts as proof and
what persuades, both in the courtroom and in our cultural imagination.
Northside strongly suggests that legal conceptions of what constitutes
good evidence may deviate from more broadly-held ideas of legitimate
proof, and that these divergences threaten to lead to injustice. Legal
standards of evidence are portrayed as rigid and conservative, too willing
to rely on the unreliable and too resistant to novel forms of knowledge.
In this Article, we show in detail how Northside sets up a hierarchy of
evidentiary forms. Expert evidence is deemed more trustworthy than
eyewitness testimony, but the photograph is portrayed as the best evidence
of all, offering proof superior to the expert and lay witness alike. Through
this hierarchy, the film not only critiques legal conceptions of evidence,
but also suggests that visible, technologically produced proof is the most
authoritative and reliable. That is, Northside suggests that the "cure" for
the problems of legal proof can be found in science, in the conclusions of
experts, and even better, in the objectivity of new technologies. Northside
imagines an ideal form of evidence that can provide for narrative closure
and moral certainty: The film is in search of proof of innocence, not
merely evidence that casts doubt on guilt. In the film, as we shall see, it is
a newly discovered photograph that provides this kind of evidence,
evidence that rises above the competing narratives of the trial-the
witnesses and counter-witnesses and contradictions-evidence that allows
no inference but innocence. 8 Or at least, as we shall argue, the photograph
168, 210 (1997); ED GoRMAN, LEE SERVER & MARTIN H. GREENBERG, THE BIG BOOK OF NOIR 5, 70
(1998). Other key authors on noir make no mention of Northside at all. Indeed, the seminal text on
film noir, RAYMONDE BORDE & ETIENNE CHAUMETON, PANORAMA Du FiLM NoR AMERICAN,
1941-1953 (1955), characterizes noir in such a way that Northside is excluded by definition: They
argue that film noir can be distinguished from other crime films in that it offers an "inside,"
psychological perspective on criminality. Id. at 1. Northside (as well as other crime "semi-
documentaries"), by contrast, focuses on the viewpoint of institutional forces like the police, the FBI,
and the newspaper industry. Following this line of thinking about noir, some critics do not even
mention Northside in their study of the genre. See, e.g., JAMES NAREMORE, FILM NOIR AND ITS
CONTEXTS (1998). Northside's uneasy fit within the typical categories of genre may help to account
for its limited critical attention, as the genre is one of Hollywood's most obvious ways of ensuring, as
film historian John Ellis phrases it, "that its films are promotable to the whole of the potential
audience." JOHN ELLIS, VISIBLE FICTIONS 200 (1982).
18. Note that in its claim that the techniques of science can provide an antidote to the
imperfections of the trial process, Northside prefigures current efforts to use DNA evidence to acquit
convicted criminals. Like the photographic evidence depicted in Northside, DNA evidence appears to
offer the possibility of rising above "mere" narrative and accessing truth directly. In this Article, we
shall argue that this is precisely the promise of visual evidence in Northside (and, we shall suggest, of
filmic evidence in actual courts as well), but that it is a promise based, in the end, on illusion. We do
not, in this Article, take up DNA evidence directly, but Northside, as a story of wrongful conviction, a
study in evidence and a critique of law, should be analyzed with DNA-especially its dazzling ability
to unravel the stories generated at trials and to turn what seemed to be compelling narratives of guilt
into "mere" fictions-in the background. For the dramatic story of the efforts of Barry Scheck and
others to use DNA to exonerate the wrongly convicted, see JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY
SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000).
2001]
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in Northside seems to do so until examined closely.
In fact, in presenting the photograph as the highest form of proof,
Northside simplifies and ignores the complications posed by photographic
evidence. The film thus invites examination of whether confidence in
visual and photographic evidence is, in fact, too easily generated, the
picture too easily believed. This question of whether cinematic evidence is
dangerously seductive is important, too, for the analysis of films as
courtroom evidence. In fact, during the two decades preceding the release
of Northside, films had made their way into actual trials, forcing judges to
determine whether they were enough like the "real thing"-or even too
much like the "real thing"-to be allowed into evidence. As we shall see,
for the most part judges shared the vision set forth in Northside of film a's
a nearly transparent medium of truth.
However, our unpacking of Northside suggests that both within legal
processes and within cinematic depictions, the power of visual evidence
necessarily relies on a kind of illusion, a willingness to ignore the
mechanisms by which visual evidence is made, shaped, and constructed.
In this sense, the courtroom and the cinema may have more in common
than might be expected: Both domains operate as theaters of proof in
which the power of sight may be both the most effective rhetorical mode
of persuasion and an especially fragile basis for conviction.19
19. Looking to a popular film for insights about law is not entirely novel. Indeed, in recent years,
there has been a groundswell of interest in the relation of law and film. See, e.g., RICHARD K.
SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE
(2000) [hereinafter SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES Pop]; LEGAL REELISM, supra note 16; Carol Clover,
Movies Juries, 48 DE PAUL L. REv. 389 (1998); Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness: Screening Nazi
Concentration Camps Before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE L.J. 449 (1995); Donald H.J.
Hermann, The Law in Cinema: An Emerging Field of Study, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 305, 306 (1998);
Orit Kamir, Judgment by Film: Socio-Legal Functions of Rashomon, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 39
(2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers: Lawyering in Literature,
Narratives, Film, and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding Career and Craft, 31 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 891 (1996); Norman Rosenberg, Hollywood on Trial: Courts and Films, 1930-1960, 12 LEGAL
HIST. REV. 341 (1994); Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in
a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1994) [hereinafter Sherwin, Law Frames]; Rennard
Strickland, The Cinematic Lawyer: The Magic Mirror and the Silver Screen, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 13 (1997); Symposium, Legal Reelism: The Hollywood Film as Legal Text, 25 LEGAL STUD. F.
199 (1993).
This emergence of "law and film" as a topic of scholarly study emerges, broadly, from the more
established "law and literature" movement, which has, in recent years, begun to turn to the analysis of
less traditional literary forms. Within the law and literature movement, there have been numerous
efforts to typologize; one distinction often made (and often criticized) is between the study of "law in
literature" and the study of "law as literature." See, e.g., IAN WARD, LAW AND LrrERATURE:
POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES 3 (1995) (detailing the "familiar distinction between law in
literature and law as literature").
While the study of law in literature is, to be sure, extensive, surprisingly little of it has focused on
the questions of evidence and proof. There are a few notable exceptions. See, e.g., ALEXANDER
WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS: NARRATIVE AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND
(1991); Judy M. CornetR, The Treachery of Perception: Evidence and Experience in Clarissa, 63 U.
CIN. L. REv. 165 (1994); Special Issue, The Status of Evidence, 108 PROC. MOD. LANG. ASSOC.
(1993). This Article explores how Northside represents and critiques legal evidence; in this sense, it
emerges from the "law in literature" (or in this instance "law in film") paradigm.
[Vol. 13:329
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We thus also use Northside as a jumping-off point for a broader
exploration of the reception of filmic evidence, first by examining
Northside as a "reenactment," a hybrid form that lies somewhere between
drama and documentary, and then, at the end of the Article, by taking a
sideways glance at the use of reenactments and other films in actual trials.
Reenactments as a form of popular entertainment have grown
exponentially in recent years, and they have also begun to receive
scholarly attention.2' No one, however, has yet explored Northside as
reenactment, or linked the film back to the actual Chicago murder case on
which it is based. Moreover, none of the recent work on reenactments
links reenactments to law and legal processes. It turns out, however, that
reenactments and trials (and their outcomes) have a special relation: They
are both, at heart, attempts to recapture the past in an authentic and
credible fashion. Neither can claim to capture the past directly, nor even to
be true in some grand metaphysical sense, but both verdicts and
reenactments want to be seen as being true to the past in all of the ways
that count.
We thus have two central purposes in this Article. The first is to
examine Northside's exploration of various modes of legal evidence,
particularly its privileging of photography as the most valuable form of
such evidence. The second goal is to offer a meditation on the hybrid
status of the reenactment, both by reflecting on Northside's status as a
reenactment and by describing the actual use of reenactments and other
films in the courtroom during the 1940s. Looking at judges' decisions
regarding reenactments during this time period reveals an unmistakable
tendency to simplify the complications posed by the use of film as
evidence. This tendency resonates not only with Northside's own
simplifying strategies but also with those of the documentary and its
related subgenres, demonstrating how both cinema and the courtroom
depend on visual nafvet6 in order to make evidence work.
This Article is divided into four Parts. The first Part looks back to the
actual Chicago wrongful conviction case on which the film was based. In
addition to bringing back to light the intriguing history of a case that
formed the basis of a popular Hollywood film, this discussion provides
necessary context for our continued attention to Northside as reenactment
in Part II. Only by reading the film with attention to the actual case can we
show how precisely the film mirrors the case on which it was based-and,
importantly, the critical junctures where it does not. The second Part of the
Article turns to the film itself. We suggest that the film is best understood
as an early exemplar of a reenactment: a retelling of a true story in
sufficient detail and with enough fidelity for the audience to understand
the film as "fact" instead of, or alongside, "fiction." We then turn to the
20. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
20011
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heart of the Article, in which we explore the film's claims and reflections
about legal evidence, but with particular attention to those places where
the film departs from its source. We argue that the film sets up a hierarchy
of evidence, with the eyewitness at the bottom and the photograph on top.
We maintain that Northside's depiction of evidence serves both to critique
legal conceptions of proof and to buttress the film's own authority as a
truthful representation of the actual case. In Part III, we turn to the use of
actual films in the courtroom around the time of Northside itself, in order
to show some of the interesting parallels between Northside's claims
about visual proof and the reception of films in actual courtrooms. Finally,
in the Conclusion, we suggest that this double examination of Northside as
a study in evidence and the reception of filmic evidence in court suggests
an important affinity between the trial and the filmed reenactment: Both
attempt to create believable stories of the past, stories not literally true that
nonetheless come to be seen as true, stories that even become substitute
depictions for what actually occurred.
I. THE ACTUAL CASE
December 9, 1932 was a cold day, even by the standards of Chicago in
the wintertime.21 It was nearly eleven degrees below zero when, at about
3:00 in the afternoon, two armed men entered Mrs. Vera Walush's
speakeasy in Chicago and announced, "This is a stick-up. 22 What began
as an attempted robbery ended in a murder: The two men shot seven bullet
holes into Officer William Lundy and then escaped unharmed in an
automobile.23 One of the bullets penetrated Lundy's heart and he died
immediately; his gun was never fired.24 Right before Christmas, a twenty-
four-year-old Polish immigrant named Joseph Majczek was arrested and
charged with the crime, and a few weeks later, a friend of his was arrested
as well. At the trial, the two defendants claimed to have alibis for the time
of the murder. Though Majczek chose not to testify because he had a
police record, witnesses provided him with an alibi, testifying that he had
been home at the time of the robbery, helping to carry coal into the
house.25 Several of the witnesses to the crime admitted that they had not
seen the two men clearly enough to make a positive identification. In fact,
initially, Vera Walush also claimed she had not gotten a good enough
look: "I was so scared that I ran away before I could look at them," she
21. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Here's the Story Behind Slaying of Policeman, CHI. DAILY
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1944, at 3.
22. Id.
23. Policeman Slain As He Grapples with Bandits, CHI. TRB., Dec. 10, 1932, at 5.
24. Id.
25. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Charge Majczek Victim of Bungling, CHI. DAILY TIMES,
Apr. 2, 1945, at 5.
[Vol. 13:329
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said in her initial statement to the police. 26 The jurors, however, never
learned about this earlier statement.27 And in the courtroom, Vera Walush
dramatically fingered the two men as the culprits, and claimed to be
certain about it.
28
Sure enough, after two hours and forty minutes of deliberation, the jury
found the two men guilty. 29 The jury declined to impose the death penalty
and instead sentenced them to ninety-nine years in prison.30 The judge
indicated subsequently that he believed that the two men were actually
innocent and that a second trial would clear them.3 He began to interview
the various witnesses himself, conducting what almost amounted to a
second trial in his judicial chambers.3 2 He told several people, including
one of the witnesses at the trial, that he did not think the trial had been
fair, and that he would do whatever it took to get the defendants another
trial, even if he had to pay for it himself.3 3 However, for reasons that never
became clear, but most likely involved the judge's desire to be re-slated in
the upcoming election, he eventually stopped pursuing the case, and died
without ever helping Majczek and his co-defendant overturn their
convictions.
3 4
The defendants appealed, but the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld their
convictions, finding, "The testimony of one witness may be sufficient
upon the question of identity. Even though denied by the accused, the
testimony of one witness may be sufficient to sustain a conviction."35
Moreover, because Majczek's incompetent attorney (who was
subsequently disbarred)3 6 had failed to make the proper motion for a new
trial, necessary to preserve the issue for consideration on appeal, the
Supreme Court declined to review the question of whether the sum of the
evidence offered was sufficient to support a conviction.
3 7
While Joseph Majczek pined away in Joliet-a prison built as a
Benthamite Panopticon-Majczek's mother toiled assiduously, scrubbing
floors in a Chicago office building, utterly convinced of her son's
26. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Postman's Story at Odds with That of "Finger Woman,"
CHI. DAILY TIMES, Nov. 29, 1944, at 3.
27. Id.
28. Woman Points Out Killers at Slaying Trial, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 9, 1933, at 7.
29. Two Get 99 Years for Police Slaying, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 1933, at 1.
30. Id.
31. McPhaul & McGuire, supra note 26, at 3.
32. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Trial Witness Insists Identification False, CHI. DAILY
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1944, at 4.
33. Id.
34. See Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Judge's Son Joins Fight To Free Joe, CHI. DAILY
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1945, at 3.
35. People v. Majczek, 195 N.E. 653, 656 (Ill. 1935).
36. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Joe Majczek's Fate up to Board, CHI. SUNDAY TIMES, Apr.
8, 1945, at 10.
37. Majczek, 195 N.E. at 656.
2001]
9
Mnookin and West: Theaters of Proof
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2001
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
innocence. She saved as much as she could, and on October 11, 1944, she
placed a classified ad in the Chicago Daily Times, saying "Five thousand
dollars reward for killers of Officer Lundy on December 9, 1932. Call
Gro-1758, 12-7 p.m."38 A young reporter noticed it, and, thinking it might
contain the seeds of a human-interest story, passed it along to her editor.
Two reporters took an interest in the case and investigated thoroughly.
One of the early articles describes how, after reading the prisoner's
account of the case,
The TIMES man found the case history an eye-opener-if. If it could
be accepted as gospel, Joe Majczek was one of the world's hard luck
guys ... . But the reporter couldn't forget that a man in prison,
brooding long nights over the loss of his freedom, often drifts into the
realm of fantasy and delusion, and in time comes to believe the
figments of his imagination. And Joe had been in prison for 11
years.39
Over time, however, the reporters became convinced of Majczek's
innocence. Not only did the prisoner pass a polygraph test,40 but the
reporters found that the police had pressured Vera Walush by threatening
her with prosecution for bootlegging, and that she had later told friends
that her identification had been false. 41 They also discovered that Vera
Walush had failed to identify Majczek the first two times she saw him in a
line-up, and that she had been hiding in a closet for the entire duration of
the robbery, affording her little chance even to glimpse the two men she
later identified as guilty.42 The reporters even tracked down some of the
original jurors at the trial, all of whom said that if they had known about
the evidence adduced by the newspaper staff, they never would have voted
to convict.
43
In August 1945, Joseph Majczek was pardoned by the governor of
Illinois and released from prison.' The Illinois legislature voted to give
him $24,000 in partial compensation for his ordeal.4 5 His wife had
divorced him at his urging and remarried to spare their son the trauma of a
38. CHI. DAILY TIMES, Oct. 10, 1944, at 30.
39. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Trial Witness Insists Identification False, CHI. DAILY
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1944, at 3.
40. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Lie Detector Clears Joe, CHI. DAILY TIMES, Dec. 4, 1944,
at 3.
41. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Swears Joe's Conviction Based on Lie, CHI. DAILY TIMES,
Dec. 3, 1944, at 4.
42. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Frame-Up Seen in Witness' Acts, CHI. DAILY TIMES, Nov.
30, 1944, at 3.
43. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, 4 Jurors Would Acquit Joe Today, CHI. DAILY TIMES, Dec.
5, 1944, at 3.
44. James McGuire & Jack McPhaul, Joe Majczek Wins Fight for Freedom, CHI. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1945, at 3.
45. Green O.K. 's $24,000for Joe Majczek, CHI. SUN, June 29, 1947, §1, at 5.
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father who was a cop-killer." After his release, Majczek and his wife
remarried, and Majczek became a modestly successful insurance
salesman. 47 Two years later, Twentieth-Century Fox bought the rights to
the story, paying $1000 to Majczek and $2500 to journalist James
McGuire, one of the authors of the Chicago Daily Times articles that led
to Majczek's freedom.48 (Jack McPhaul, the other author of the series of
articles, received no payment.)
49
II. CALL NORTHSIDE 777
A. Northside as Reenactment
As it opens onto its first scene, Northside promises to offer an explicit
recounting of the Majczek story, a promise on which it largely delivers.
The film in fact follows the original case to a remarkable degree and in
tremendous detail. In order to assure viewers of its fidelity to history, the
film begins by appropriating documentary codes and rhetoric. It alerts us
(through the opening image of a "shooting script" stamped "urgent") that
this is a "true story" whose scenes have all been shot on location in
Chicago.50 Unusually for its time, Northside was shot almost entirely on
location, and partly in the very settings where the actual case had taken
place. A stentorian voice-over guides us through the film's first ten
minutes, recounting both the history of Chicago after the great fire of 1871
and the facts of the murder case on which the film is based.5 With
documentary-like style camerawork, including high-grain film, long shots
of the city's seedy neighborhoods and buildings, and footage from actual
police arrests in Chicago during the 1930s, the clear intention of the film
is to appear to reconstruct the crime and the investigation faithfully-both
to expose the injustice of Frank Wiecek's conviction and to reveal and
46. Jack McPhaul & James McGuire, Stork Plays Role in Joe's Defense, CHI. DAILY TIMES, Dec.
2, 1944, at 3.
47. Joseph Majczek Dies; Wrongfully Convicted in Killing, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 31, 1983.
48. Houston, supra note 13.
49. Id.
50. The film was indeed shot substantially on location, with locations that included a variety of
Chicago streets, the 19th precinct, the questioning room in the Chicago Criminal Courts building, and
the state penitentiary at Joliet. See Exhibitor's Campaign Sheet, CALL NORTHSIDE 777 (n.d.) (on file
with authors); see also Houston, supra note 13. Similarly, Hathaway's The House on 92nd Street
begins with an introductory title that tells us that the film was "photographed in the actual places the
original incidents occurred."
51. The use of this kind of voice-over provides another way in which Northside departs from film
noir. Noir frequently employs voice-overs by characters whom we discover through the film's diegesis
to be unreliable, delusional, or simply uninformed. Classic examples of this pattern include Edward
Dmytryk's MURDER, MY SWEET (RKO 1944), Billy Wilder's DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount 1944),
and Orson Welles's THE LADY FROM SHANGAI (Columbia 1948). An equally powerful, but less well-
known, film noir is Anthony Mann's RAW DEAL (Edward Small Productions 1948), which provides
one of the only instances of a female voice-over in the noir canon.
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revel in the possibilities of film as a medium for truth.52 As advertisements
for the movie proclaimed, "Every word is true."53
Yet, in what will turn out to be the first of several disruptive shifts in the
film, the first ten minutes of documentary soon give way to classical
Hollywood narrative.54 Northside switches from exterior shots of Chicago
that perform as social history to interior shots of the Chicago Times,
signaling to the viewer that a more personalized, even if institutionalized,
perspective will now take over. And, sure enough, the series of interior
shots concludes with James Stewart's face in close-up, a shot meant to
accentuate his star status and all the associations of honesty it carried with
it. The film thus turns to the identifiable and less-threatening terrain of
classical narrative, offering a reprieve for audiences from its own
documentary strategies and impulses, "making truth b6th dramatically
effective and comfortably acceptable," according to J.P. Telotte, one of
the few film critics who has given Northside scholarly attention.5
But Northside does not shift from gritty documentary to classic film
narrative simply to appease its audience. By borrowing tropes and visual
conventions from two typically distinct genres, the film forces us to
recognize the ways in which two supposedly distinct modes of
filmmaking, documentary and drama, converge.5 6 Moreover, the blending
52. The House on 92nd Street also employs footage of the actual investigation on which it was
based.
53. Exhibitor's Campaign Sheet, supra note 51.
54. Indeed, the documentary "look" does not fully appear again until the last few minutes of the
film-an important point, given that what is sandwiched in between is mainly classical narrative,
Hollywood style. At the film's ending, the stentorian voice-over returns, as do the long shots, which
provide the sense that the film is pulling away from the personal story of Wiecek and McNeal in order
to position itself once again as being interested in larger, social problems-in problems, that is, that
make up the content of the documentary.
55. TELOTTE, supra note 16, at 136. Rosenberg reads this transition as the film's move away from
a "distanced," critical look at the police to a sympathetic focus on the private individual, who must
fight against the injustices caused by institutional forces such as the police. Rosenberg, supra note 16,
at 285.
56. Of course, even supposedly "pure" documentaries raise similar questions about the ways in
which they are constructed and fictional. Telotte writes of the "uncertainty" and "contradiction" that
characterize Northside and hybrid films like it in general, but theoretically, these adjectives can
describe even the most "truthful" of documentaries, because the genre must always work against and
through the fictionalizing tendencies of cinema. See TELOTTE, supra note 16, at 135-37. Media
historian Paula Rabinowitz, describes how documentary films "speak about themselves as
contradictory texts. Full of self-doubts about their status as organs of truth and reality, the films and
their criticism unravel like so much celluloid on the cutting-room floor." PAULA RABINOWITZ, THEY
MUST BE REPRESENTED: THE POLITICS OF DOCUMENTARY 23 (1994). Although not exclusively
devoted to documentary film, her study offers an especially fascinating look at the genre because of
the way it interweaves multiple modes of representation in Depression-Era America (such as the
photographs taken by the Farm Security Administration and populist writing) with documentary film
per se. See also MICHAEL RENOV, THEORIZING DOCUMENTARY 1-14 (1993). In the introduction to the
book, Renov provides a useful list of some of the key "fictive elements" that appear in many
nonfiction films: the construction of character, the use of poetic language, narration, or musical
accompaniment to heighten emotional impact, the creation of suspense, the use of high or low camera
angles, close-ups "which trade emotional resonance for spatial integrity," and the use of editing. Id. at
3. Thus, we fully recognize that some of the arguments we make about how reenactments force
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of genres invites questions about narrative form: Exactly how should
stories be produced? What kind of stories best capture a viewer's
attention, documentaries or dramas? Which are most likely to persuade,
those that reproduce the actual as literally as possible, or those that smooth
out the rough edges of reality, playing to sentiment and even sensation?
The inevitably complex relation among representation, reality, and
persuasion plays out within the film first in the relation between McNeal's
newspaper stories and Wiecek's "real" circumstances. The same questions
recur in the second half of the film, when Northside dramatically shifts its
focus from the newspaper industry and how it produces stories to the legal
system and how it weighs evidence. Finally, the film as a whole and its
relation to the actual Majczek case invite a similar inquiry into the thorny
problem of what it means to represent an event faithfully. We will
continue to take up these questions throughout this Article.
The first half of Northside looks at how the newspaper industry
responds to the Wiecek case, illustrating the newspaper's propensity for
sensationalism. Like the actual reporters on whom he was based, the
character played by James Stewart, J.P. McNeal, specializes in human-
interest stories. And, as Hollywood drama, Northside aligns itself with the
kinds of stories McNeal produces: stories that reduce the plurality of wills,
purposes, and loose ends to a unified narrative of a mother's faith, a son's
devotion, and innocence revealed. As McNeal types away at his
typewriter, we recognize that the stories' implied readership closely
resembles the viewers envisioned by the film: an audience desirous of a
seemingly objective point of view, adherence to a cause-effect logic,
characters who elicit our sympathies, and a progression toward narrative
closure-all the elements, in short, that constitute the stuff of classical
film narrative.
5 7
Indeed, by spotlighting the stereotyped, sensational stories McNeal
writes about the Wiecek case, Northside initially takes the production of
classical narrative as its underlying subject. Rather than representing the
facts of the case, McNeal garners tremendous public interest in Wiecek's
case by writing stories with "mass appeal" -what he himself calls
"hammering out a sob story." He "plays up" the "mother angle" and the
"police corruption angle," for example, even when there is not yet any
clear indication that the police acted unprofessionally. 58
epistemological questions could also be applied to documentaries: Still, what interests us in particular
about the reenactment is precisely that it is explicitly fiction though it claims the authority we associate
with the representation of the actual.
57. Much critical discussion has been devoted to the subject of classical narrative cinema. The
most insightful work on the subject includes the following: DUDLEY ANDREW, CONCEPTS IN FILM
THEORY (1984); ELLIS, supra note 17; JAKOB LOTHE, NARRATIVE IN FICTION AND FILM: AN
INTRODUCTION (2000); and Laura Mulvey, Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, SCREEN 19
(1979).
58. This rather cynical look at how the newspaper industry functions is surprisingly common in
film noir. Other films that offer negative representations of the newspaper or magazine industry
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Importantly, the very "angles" he takes in his stories are those exploited
by the film-the faith and devotion of Wiecek's mother, the loyalty of her
son, and ultimately the possibility of police corruption-as if McNeal's
hunches for what makes good story material predict the filmic content. To
reinforce the connection between McNeal's stories and the cinematic
narrative, the camera repeatedly zooms in on McNeal's printed words as
they appear in his typewriter. As we see in close-up titles such as "Wiecek
places faith in mother" and "Mother slaves to save son," we recognize that
these titles perform as textual summaries of what we have just witnessed
on film.
At the same time, we also know that these titles, and the stories that
follow them, do not accurately represent all that we have seen. We are
thus encouraged to believe that we have a privileged viewpoint, privileged
not only as compared to that of the film's imaginary readers of the
newspaper but also as compared to the viewpoint of the actual readers of
the case in 1932." 9 This double viewpoint-the sense that we are being
manipulated by the film as if we were newspaper readers, and a
simultaneous belief that we are receiving a more "truthful" version of the
case-harks back to the film's opening image of a typed page from a
manuscript stating that Northside is a "true story" and also a "shooting
script." Documentary and fiction at once, the pages from Northside's
script are indeed like those of the newspaper's: Both tell truth and fiction,
even if the film encourages us to see it as somehow coming closer to the
real than its textual counterpart.
While McNeal's early stories may attract readers, they cannot directly
win Wiecek his freedom because they traffic mainly in narrative devices,
not in evidence. "In the world Northside sketches, fictionalizing itself
becomes the true antagonist, the impulse to veil or disguise reality, the
culprit against which the film's documentary strategy is mobilized,"
Telotte argues.6" In order to exonerate Wiecek, McNeal must abandon his
sensational narratives for facts, or more accurately, for an alternative
means of shaping his narratives. Consequently, the film reaches an
important turning point when McNeal finally loses his skepticism about
Wiecek's innocence and declares that "I'm willing to dig, get the facts."
At this halfway point in the film, McNeal becomes an investigator as well
as a storyteller, getting affidavits, digging through police files, unearthing
include John Farrow's THE BIG CLOCK (Paramount 1948) and Fritz Lang's THE BLUE GARDENIA
(Alex Gottlieb Productions 1953), BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT (Bert Friedlob Productions 1956),
and WHILE THE CITY SLEEPS (Bert Friedlob Productions 1956).
59. A miniature version of this position occurs frequently in film noir, in scenes where the camera
provides a close-up shot of the front page of a newspaper. As we read the newspaper's factual account
of the storyline that we are following in the film, we realize that we know much more than the
newspaper account provides, both in terms of the facts of the case and the psychological motivations
of the characters involved. For interesting examples of this technique, see Vincent Sherman's NORA
PRENTISS (Warner Brothers 1947), and Arthur Lubin's IMPACT (United Artists 1949).
60. TELOTTE, supra note 16, at 149.
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photographs. Soon he begins to learn about what constitutes evidence-
evidence, that is, according to the law. And in so doing, he transforms into
a very different kind of reporter.
Indeed, the law serves as a kind of corrective institution to the
newspaper industry here.6 Though represented as inflexible and severe,
its expectations for proof demand a deeper level of investigation and
commitment from McNeal.62 More importantly, they demand the same
things from the film itself. By setting up the law's criteria for conclusive
evidence as the catalyst for its own climax, Northside redefines its own
methods and objectives midway through the film. The film moves slightly
away from classical narrative-away from emotional scenarios focused
mainly on Wiecek's mother and her belief in her son-toward a more
scientific, "objective" examination of the Wiecek case. Indeed, Northside
becomes an exhibition of and meditation on three different kinds of
evidence, each of which we will discuss in detail: eyewitness testimony,
expert testimony in the form of a lie detector test, and a photograph. The
result of this journey through evidence, as we will see in Part III, is a clear
hierarchy that privileges image over narrative, or more accurately, upholds
the photographic image as offering an ideal type of narrative because it
offers a seemingly ideal type of evidence.
While the first half of Northside focuses on McNeal and the
investigative articles he produces, the second half thus presents an
extensive meditation on how the legal system decides what counts as
admissible evidence. Like other hybrid crime films of the period,
particularly The House on 92nd Street and T-Men, Northside spotlights
modem techniques of detection, and in so doing, as Frank Krutnik
explains in his book on masculinity and film noir, presents detection "not
as a matter of intuitive action but as one of organizational machinery."63
As we show in the next Part, this concentration on "organizational
machinery" bolsters Northside's own documentary claims by suggesting
that photography is the most effective of all such machineries.'
61. This positioning of the law as a corrective force against fiction is, of course, conveniently
na'fve. Following in a long tradition of scholarship on the subject, Richard K. Sherwin has recently
made clear the extent to which law depends on storytelling. See SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP,
supra note 19, at 41-71. For classic accounts of the importance of narrative and storytelling to the trial
process, see W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM 62 (1981); and Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991) (arguing that juries turn evidence into
narrative).
62. In this sense, our interpretation of Northside differs radically from Rosenberg's. While he sees
the film as consistently critical of law, we read Northside as offering a more ambivalent
representation. On the one hand, the film does portray the legal institution as both narrowminded and
inflexible. On the other hand, the law tempers and corrects McNeal's initial penchant for
sensationalizing and drawing assumptions without conclusive evidence. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at
283.
63. KRUTNIK, supra note 16, at 203.
64. Other films that spotlight visual machineries include Anthony Mann's T-Men, which presents
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This celebration of photography as a machinery of truth, creates a
tension in Northside between the claims of narrative and those of the
image. The film's climax rests on the authority of the photograph:
Narrative seems to give way in Northside to the silence of a single,
indisputable image. As silent witness, the photograph apparently stands
opposed to narrative, its evidentiary power seemingly not in need of
literary or even verbal accompaniment. Indeed, after the photograph offers
the proof Wiecek needs to be set free, we never see the reporter McNeal
write a story again. By following this trajectory, the film ultimately resists
confronting its own fictional pressures and motivations. For all its
exploration of how narrative and evidence work, Northside resists
exploring the ways in which its documentary impulses are contradicted by
its fictional impulses, by its effort to tell a story that, like McNeal's, will
possess mass appeal. Just as importantly, it ignores the fact that all
photographs, once they are enlisted for evidence, also get enlisted-to
however small or great degree-for fiction.
Northside is part tearjerker, part documentary. It is often characterized
as a film noir, but in many important ways Northside is far from noir,
whose narratives generally defy logic, closure, and optimism, embracing
ambiguity and cynicism as their modus operandi.65 We suggest that the
best single classification of Northside is as a "reenactment."66 The
a dazzling and elaborate scene in which the police construct a life-size image of a criminal suspect on
a projection screen as various witnesses provide their physical description of him. Henry Hathaway's
The House on 92nd Street spotlights the various surveillance techniques, including hidden cameras
and two-way mirrors, employed by the FBI.
65. Noirs, of course, range in both degrees of cynicism and narrative experimentation.
Interestingly, those films that provide the most complex narrative structures (using such techniques as
convoluted time frames, voice-over narrators who withhold or misrepresent information, and
flashbacks) often figure as the most cynical in subject matter and tone, since the corruption and decay
they spotlight is exacerbated for the viewer by the confusion she feels in following the storyline.
Examples of such films include Anatole Litvak's SORRY, WRONG NUMBER (Hall Wallis 1948),
Jacques Tourneur's OUT OF THE PAST (RKO 1947), and Orson Welles's The Lady from Shangai.
66. Based on an actual murder case, Elia Kazan's Boomerang also falls within our classification
of "reenactment." Indeed, the parallels between Kazan's film and Northside are striking: Both begin
with voice-overs that recount the details of the murder; both include documentary-style footage that
details police work following the murder, such as the rounding up of suspects, examination of
eyewitnesses, and search for clues; both indict eyewitness testimony as unreliable and inaccurate.
Boomerang also combines the visual style and strategies of documentary and film noir. Like
Northside, it continually forces its viewers to shift their vantage point as it moves back and forth
between the conventions of classical narrative, noir lighting, and unusual camera angles to a realistic
documentary style. As in Northside, this combination is designed to complicate the film's own claims
to truth. Boomerang repeatedly admits that its understanding and knowledge of the crime are
limited-indeed, like Northside, it chooses as its historical basis a case that was never solved.
Boomerang was based on the aftermath of a murder in Bridgeport, Connecticut in 1924, in which a
much-loved local priest was shot to death. There was no apparent motive for his murder. A poor
vagabond who matched the murderer's description was soon arrested. Numerous wimesses identified
him, ballistics experts matched his gun to the bullet used in the killing, and the suspect even confessed
to the crime. It appeared to be, as the prosecutor later told the court, "a well-nigh perfect case,
affording but very little difficulty in the matter of successful prosecution." Homer S. Cummings, The
State vs. Harold Israel, 15 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. 7 CRIMINOLOGY 406, 414 (1925). But when district
attorney Homer S. Cummings (who would later become Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Attorney
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reenactment as a generic form has, until recently, received little scholarly
attention, perhaps partly because it is sometimes seen as low-brow, and
partly because it is hard to categorize, belonging comfortably neither to
the realm of documentary nor to the domain of fiction. However,
academics and cultural commentators have begun to turn their attention to
the form. This may be the result of the recent explosion of film and
television reenactments of scandals-from Jon-Benet Ramsey to Amy
Fisher-and of more serious quasi-historical films like JFK or Mississippi
Burning.
67
General), arrived to prosecute the case, he announced that he would instead ask for a nolle prosequi.
Despite the seemingly overwhelming evidence against the suspect, the prosecutor had found after
meticulous investigation that the evidence simply did not hold up. The well-nigh perfect case turned
out to be as leaky as a sieve. Charges were dropped, and the case was never solved. For the
prosecutor's full statement to the court describing the evidence and its flaws, see id. On the case more
generally, see Anthony Abbott, A Perfect Case, 6 THE ROTARIAN 14 (1945). Like Northside,
Boomerang follows the real incident on which it is based in tremendous detail, though like Northside,
it also departs from the true story in one important particular, designed to provide the viewer with a
kind of certainty and closure that the real world story lacked. Instead of leaving the case wholly
unsolved, as it was in real life, the film version provides the viewer with an alternative murderer and a
theory of the crime, though the details are left murky.
Most importantly for our purposes here, Boomerang shares Northside's interest in the
epistemological complexities of reenactments; indeed, Boomerang's interest is arguably even more
self-conscious and self-reflexive than Northside's. The final third of Boomerang focuses on the trial of
the suspect, a trial in which the state's attorney proves the man's innocence through various
reenactments of the events leading up to the murder. Designed only to prove the innocence of the
suspect rather than to identify the actual murderer, these reenactments show that it would have been
physically impossible for the suspect to have committed the murder and that the testimony of the
witnesses was false. The film presents these reenactments in two ways: in the film's present, with the
prosecutor acting out events before the jury in the courtroom, and in the film's past, through
flashbacks that show the attorney and his group of assistants reenacting the details of the crime in the
actual places where they happened. These reenactments perform two functions: (1) They link film
viewers with jury members as they complicate for both groups the details of the crime and, more
importantly, (2) They draw attention to the film's own status as a reenactment, alerting us to the fact
that, like these individual reenactments, the film can only say what did not happen; it cannot offer
complete truth. As Telotte remarks in his useful discussion of the film, "It's as if the film itself were
on trial, its method for revealing truth called into question." TELOTTE, supra note 16, at 142.
In some ways, the challenge presented by Northside and Boomerang resembles, though not nearly
with the same degree of self-consciousness, recent films represented by the "New Documentary"
movement. Characterized by self-reflexivity and interactive techniques, the New Documentary marks
an attempt to overcome any simple dichotomy between truth and fiction. As film theorist Linda
Williams observes in her essay on the movement, these films suggest that there is no "a priori, self-
evident truth to be "captured" by the camera, but that there are multifaceted, receding horizons of
"truth" that can be constructed within a multivocal (multigazing) form." Linda Williams, The Ethics of
Intervention: Dennis O'Rourke 's The Good Woman of Bangkok, in COLLECTING VISIBLE EVIDENCE
176, 183 (Jane M. Gaines & Michael Renov eds., 1999). The foremost figure in this movement is
Errol Morris, whose widely acclaimed film THE THIN BLUE LINE (American Playhouse 1988)
garnered so much critical attention precisely because it questioned its own participation in the
representation of truth. Other directors whose work is representative of this movement are Dennis
O'Rourke and feminist filmmaker Trinh T. Minh-ha. For more information on the movement, see
generally COLLECTING VISIBLE EVIDENCE, supra. See also Linda Williams, Mirrors Without
Memories: Truth, History, and the New Documentary, FILM QUARTERLY 9 (Spring 1993); and
Sherwin, Law Frames, supra note 19.
67. See, e.g., JOHN CORNER, THE ART OF RECORD (1994); DEREK PAGET, No OTHER WAY TO
TELL IT: DRAMADOC/DOCUDRAMA ON TELEVISION (1998); ALAN ROSENTHAL, WRITING
DOCUDRAMA: DRAMATIZING REALITY FOR FILM AND TV (1995); WHY DOCUDRAMA: FACT-FICTION
ON FILM AND TV (Alan Rosenthal ed., 1999) [hereinafter WHY DOCUDRAMA]. Much of the recent
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In a thoughtful discussion of the genre, Steve Lipkin describes how the
reenactment (or, as he calls it, the docudrama) functions:
Even as docudrama departs from documentary proper, the two modes
retain a certain semiotic similarity .... The documentary image
functions as an index; comparable imagery in docudrama remains
primarily iconic; however, docudrama asks if, under its terms, the
two signs might not be all that different. The films' often high degree
of resemblance to [the] actual ... creat[es] what amount to indexical
icons, signs with direct, strongly motivated resemblances to their
actual referents. We are offered argument by analogy, the analogies
(images) often appearing to be the most literal kind.68
In his book on television docudrama in America and Britain, media
scholar Derek Paget also emphasizes that the reenactment is "an
inherently indexical form," necessarily pointing "beyond the realm of
fiction to a realm of non-fiction that is always already-lived. ' 69 He writes,
The drama-documentary seeks to overlay the Stanislavskian
emotional equivalence of "As If' with a documentary-indexical "See
This!". The relation to reality claimed in the solely dramatic "as if'
through equivalence and parallel is asserted in dramatic documentary
mode through the repetitions of reconstruction/reenactment (these
words/actions, in this place-with a gesture back to "that time").
Where one set of actions is in parallel to the real, the other is an
attempt to superimpose, to fit with a template, an acted "reality" on
film on to a previous, unfilmed one.7°
Understanding Northside as a reenactment emphasizes its dual
allegiances: both to representing the true story on which it is based and to
telling a powerful and dramatic tale. These theorists of the reenactment
offer two useful concepts for examining Northside. First, Lipkin's concept
of the indexical icon lets us see how the film aims simultaneously to offer
both index and icon: a literal telling of a particular truth and something
broader, more eternal and allegorical. Divided in purpose, Northside
necessarily demands a divided response from viewers, who must not
forget either that it is a Hollywood drama or that it is true. Moreover,
scholarship uses the term "docudrama" or "drama-documentary" for that which we term
"reenactment." We prefer the term "reenactment," both because it resonates with the filmed
reenactments used in trials that we shall discuss in the final part of the Article, and because
"docudrama" can suggest a much broader (and for our purposes too broad) range of material. The term
"docudrama" can refer not only to dramatic renderings of actual occurrences (or, what we term
"reenactments"), but also to dramas inspired only loosely by actual events or drawn from a collection
of actual instances, or even to the presentation of wholly fictional material in a documentary-like
fashion. For a much broader cultural analysis of the prevalence and significance of copies, doubles,
twins, and reenactments, see HILLEL SCHWARTZ, THE CULTURE OF THE COPY (1996).
68. Steve Lipkin, Defining Docudrama, in WHY DOCUDRAMA, supra note 67, at 371-72.
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Paget's idea that the reenactment operates like a template, fitting over the
real while still allowing departure from the actual so long as the basic
"shape" is maintained, invites us to explore the correspondence between
the film and the material on which it is based, to see when the template fits
and when it fails.
Thinking about Northside as a reenactment thus focuses attention both
on its fidelity to the actual case on which it is based and on its status as a
fictional representation. It highlights how the film sets itself up as a
Hollywood drama that can nonetheless be trusted as an account of what
"really" happened.7" Reenactments straddle the actual and the fictional,
and they necessarily raise questions about belief, persuasion and proof.
What makes an audience believe that the story they watch is essentially
true? How much dramatic license can a reenactment take before losing the
authority that comes from an alliance with the actual? In what follows we
will look in detail at how Northside treats questions of evidence and proof.
B. The Question of Evidence in Northside
The single most remarkable feature of Northside is the fact that it takes
evidence itself as its subject. Indeed, the film continuously circles around
questions of proof, evidence, and facts. In the newspaper reporter's first
encounter with the convict, he tells Wiecek that he has read the record and
it does not "whitewash you, the way I see it." Wiecek responds, "But you
only read what convicted me. All the true facts didn't come out." As
McNeal reveals his skepticism, Wiecek asks him, "You don't believe me,
do you?" The reporter is unabashed. "Listen, I talked to your mother.
She's a very fine old woman. She believes you, I need proof."
Later in the film, McNeal is forced to tell Wiecek's mother that they are
going to have to call off the hearing before the Pardon Board because they
lack sufficient evidence. She is both outraged and dismissive: "Evidence?
They got no evidence when they sent my Frank to prison for ninety-nine
years. I got no evidence when I scrub floors every night, go without
supper, walk to work, so I save a nickel for Frank. Evidence. What is this
evidence?"
By the end of the film, McNeal has had a conversion, and it is his turn
to criticize the Pardon Board for its narrow conception of proof:
Strictly from a reporter's point, you understand, I've assembled what
I feel is a very solid case. It consists of such debatable items as a lie
detector test. Now I realize that you're unable to accept that. You
want evidence. But sometimes the weight of evidence, just because
it's in the record, is heavy enough to crush the truth.
71. Lipkin emphasizes that docudramas "warrant": "The viewer is invited to accept the argument
that re-creation warrants, that what we see might have 'really' happened in 'much this way."' Lipkin,
supra note 68, at 372.
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"We'll discuss the shortcomings of the judicial system some other time,
Mr. McNeal," a member of the board of pardons replies curtly.
We can see in these three brief moments a complex relation between
faith, evidence, and proof. The mother requires no evidence at all. She
believes in her son's innocence because she believes in her son. The most
incriminating evidence would not dislodge her belief, for it is based on
faith rather than inference from evidence. However, when she places the
ad offering reward money in exchange for evidence of the real killer, she
recognizes that the rest of the world cannot share her faith, and that her
only hope of overturning her son's conviction is to locate new evidence,
either of her son's innocence or of someone else's guilt. Thus she works
for years, saving the money that she hopes may buy the proof she needs:
the money that may spur someone to take an interest, to come forward
with the evidence that will persuade others of what she already knows.
By contrast, McNeal, the reporter, starts out doubtful about Wiecek's
innocence. He is on assignment, and he is initially dubious that there is
anything even worth investigating in this now stale murder case. He has to
be badgered by his editor into pursuing the matter at all. At first, McNeal
figures that because he has been tried and convicted, Wiecek is almost
certainly guilty; the legal judgment of conviction is itself adequate proof
of guilt to satisfy the reporter. After their exchange in prison, McNeal is
intrigued but still skeptical, just like the actual reporters on whom he was
based. Over the course of the film, however, McNeal comes to be entirely
persuaded that Wiecek has been the victim of a miscarriage of justice. He
comes to share Wiecek's mother's faith in her son-but his is a faith that
emerges from his reading of the evidence, not from an unshakeable belief
in the good character of a particular man.72 Moreover, he has become a
critic of the legal system's too-narrow conception of evidence. There is, he
believes, proof that can persuade and reveal the truth, yet that will
nonetheless be rejected as legal evidence. As he gains faith in Wiecek's
innocence, he loses faith in law and legal processes. He fears that
evidence, in the legal sense, can crush the truth. And, as the film
progresses, it almost does.
The Eyewitness
In the film (as in Joe Majczek's actual criminal trial), the primary legal
72. The film's depiction of the necessary quantum of proof to persuade is explicitly gendered. It is
the female characters-not only Wiecek's mother, but also McNeal's wife-who are prepared to
believe without explicit proof, while for McNeal, merely wanting to believe is not enough to persuade
him. In a living-room exchange, McNeal's wife asks him, "Why don't you let go? You want him to be
innocent, you want him to be free." "Well, maybe you're right. Maybe I do want him to be free, but
that doesn't make me believe he's innocent," counters McNeal. "You want to believe. That's enough,"
his wife insists. This, of course, reflects a classically gendered opposition between faith and proof, or,
more typically, emotion and reason. Thanks are due to Fred Blumberg for pointing out to us the
significance of gender in Northside.
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evidence against the defendant was the identification provided by an
eyewitness to the shooting, the owner of the speakeasy in which the
policeman was killed. And it turns out that this eyewitness was lying. The
film never explains why the owner was lying. McNeal seeks out the
witness and eventually finds her. She is nervous and uncooperative, but
she neither recants nor offers any explanation for her original
incriminating testimony-nor does she even acknowledge that she failed
to tell the truth. Implicitly, the film suggests that she may have been
coerced by the police. After all, she was engaged in bootlegging and thus
may have been pressured under threat of prosecution to identify Wiecek.
In fact, in the actual case, there was strong evidence suggesting that the
speakeasy owner was indeed pressured; she subsequently even admitted to
a friend that her identification was "improper and false."73 When her
friend prodded her conscience, asking her how she could help convict an
innocent man, Vera Walush's response was, "Well, what the hell did you
expect me to do? I had to go along with the police, didn't IT"' In the film,
however, the speakeasy owner's motive for identifying Majczek/Wiecek
remains murky, as does her fear and unwillingness to explain herself
eleven years later.
By failing to provide a specific explanation for this particular
eyewitness's perjury, the film implies that eyewitness testimony in general
ought to be viewed with suspicion. The report of one's own eyes may be
unreliable and false-and the legal approach to evidence, the film
suggests, does not adequately take into account the limits of eyewitnesses'
vision. Eyewitnesses may be corruptible or just plain mistaken. Human
testimony can be marred by police pressure, the fallibility of memory,
fear, the lapse of time, or worst of all, deliberate falsehood.7" As posed by
Northside, the unreliability of eyewitnesses is less a problem of inevitable
subjectivity than it is a problem of no mechanism for measurement, no
way of knowing who-or what-is worthy of credit. Eyewitness
testimony is presented as too mediated and too subjective to be
trustworthy, especially when that which has been seen is not shared by
others, is not part of a larger vision, a corroborated story. The film thus
suggests that while eyewitness testimony is sufficient to support a
conviction in the legal sense, it ought not to be deemed sufficient to
support conviction in the sense of belief.
Concerns about the accuracy and fidelity of eyewitnesses are nothing
73. McPhaul & McGuire, supra note 41, at 4.
74. Id.
75. A significant literature has emerged on the limits of eyewitness testimony, focusing in
particular on the frequency with which eyewitness identification can be mistaken. See, e.g., BRIAN L.
CUTLER & STEVEN PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
LAW (1995); ELIZA3ETH LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1996); Samuel Gross, Loss of Innocence:
Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, J. LEG. ST. 395 (1987); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau,
Eyewitness Identification, I PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765 (1995).
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new. Literary critic Alexander Welsh, for example, has argued that as
early as the eighteenth century, novelists, scientists, and judges all came to
prefer the evidence of "things not seen"76 to that of human testimony,
viewing inferences from uncontested circumstances as stronger evidence
than an eyewitness account. 7 Even though this concern with the fallibility
of the eyewitness is longstanding, both crime semi-documentaries and
classic film noir evince a particular concern, even obsession, with the
limits of the eyewitness, all of the ways in which such evidence can be
corrupted or merely mistaken.78 These film genres thus reflect a growing
recognition that human memory is frail and suggestible, that line-ups and
photospreads might be tainted by conscious or unconscious signaling on
the part of the authorities, and that the passage of time has a negative
effect on memory. Northside is thus one of a spate of films dealing with
crime during the 1940s and 1950s that share a marked concern with the
unreliability of human testimony. One of the most notable examples of
film noir's treatment of this theme, for example, is Alfred Hitchcock's The
Wrong Man,79 in which an innocent man (Henry Fonda) is almost
convicted of armed robbery because four separate witnesses make a
"positive identification" of him as the culprit. As in Northside, all of those
who could testify to his innocence are either missing or dead.8"
Boomerang, a 1947 film directed by Elia Kazan, also emphasizes the
unreliability of eyewitnesses. In this film, a beloved priest is murdered one
evening on a street comer, and multiple eyewitnesses subsequently
identify a suspect, John Waldron, as the killer. Waldron is arrested and
brought to trial in what appears to be an open-and-shut case. But after
carefully attempting to verify the eyewitnesses' claims and staging
reenactments of the crime itself, the prosecutor becomes convinced that
the suspect did not, in fact, commit the murder, and asks the judge to drop
the charges. Like Northside, Boomerang was based on a true story, and
like Northside, the film emphasizes the precariousness of justice. Just as
76. WELSH, supra note 19, at 7 (citing Hebrews 11:1 ("Now faith is the substance of things hoped
for, the evidence of things not seen.").
77. See generally id. at 2-42.
78. In addition to the films discussed in our Article, other titles include Robert Siodmak's
PHANTOM LADY (Universal 1944), in which a cabdriver, bartender, and singer are all paid off by a
wealthy murderer not to corroborate the alibi of an innocent man, who is then tried, convicted, and
sentenced to die in eighteen days; Robert Siodmak's THE FILE ON THELMA JORDAN (Hall Wallis
1950), in which the prosecuting attorney pejures himself on the stand by lying about evidence so as to
defend the woman he is supposedly prosecuting; Jack Arnold's THE TATTERED DRESS (Universal-
International 1957), which depicts a notoriously amoral lawyer who is charged by a juror with
bribery-only for the film to later reveal that the juror had been lying all along; and Otto Preminger's
ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia 1959), in which several eyewitnesses lie on the stand to protect
themselves from a man they fear.
79. THE WRONG MAN (Warner Brothers 1956).
80. This is also a recurring motif in Alfred Hitchcock's films, including THE THIRTY-NINE STEPS
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Wiecek would never have been freed but for the enterprising efforts of
McNeal, Waldron would surely have been convicted and locked away if it
hadn't been for a persevering district attorney who investigated the case
with a diligence hardly typical and who refused to cave in to political
pressure to prosecute.
In Sidney Lumet's Twelve Angry Men,81 a juror (also played by Henry
Fonda) persuades eleven other jurors to change their votes because he
consistently demonstrates how easily an eyewitness can be deceived. He
points to the case of one woman who swears she saw through a window a
son murder his father, even though she was too nearsighted to view
anything clearly at such a distance; and the case of an elderly man who
stated that he opened his apartment door when he heard a crash and saw
the son fleeing the scene of the crime, even though, as Fonda proves, his
handicapped leg would have prevented him from walking fast enough to
open the door in time.82 In both cases, the eyewitnesses do not seem to be
acting out of malice; they are simply convinced that what they remember
is true. Perhaps the most notorious filmic expos6 of eyewitness
unreliability, Billy Wilder's Witness for the Prosecution,83 focuses on the
wife of an alleged murderer (Marlene Dietrich) who appears in court as a
hostile witness against her husband, precisely so that she can then create a
false identity and appearance, meet with the defending attorney, and
produce letters that will discredit her own damaging testimony against her
husband.
Whereas crime semi-documentaries of this time period tend to represent
eyewitnesses as unreliable so as to promote the need for more scientific
means of establishing evidence, classic film noir tends to use the figure of
the unreliable eyewitness as a means of illustrating the unreliability of all
discourse in modern culture. "Through a thematic focus on our discourse,"
J.P. Telotte writes, "these films [film noir] show how fundamentally our
communications, even the movies themselves, carry a certain estranging
force, one that renders all discourse precarious and every effort at human
communication a risky wager against misunderstanding and alienation."84
Telotte includes semi-documentaries like Northside with such
unmistakable noirs as Edward Dmytryk's Murder, My Sweet and Anatole
Litvak's Sorry, Wrong Number as support for this observation. But Telotte
fails to recognize that semi-documentaries and classic film noir possess
widely different reasons for their focus on narrative unreliability. Semi-
documentaries are much more invested in the unreliability of eyewitnesses
81. TWELVE ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957).
82. Given the fact that only one year earlier, Hitchcock had cast Henry Fonda as a man whose life
is nearly ruined by false eyewitness testimony in The Wrong Man, it seems highly probable that Lumet
was capitalizing on this association by casting Fonda as the juror most skeptical of such testimony.
83. WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION (United Artists 1957).
84. TELOTTE, supra note 16, at 30.
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as a social problem that needs to be corrected through more efficient
means of detection, while classic film noir is, as a genre, much more
interested in the lying or mistaken witness as an existential problem that,
by its very nature, cannot be corrected.
While Northside clearly takes a much more "documentary" approach to
crime than a classic film noir allows, its spotlight on the unreliability of
eyewitness testimony is the element that brings the film closest to the
style, mood, and overall effect of classic film noir. After locating its
viewers in generally well-lit, "safe" settings such as McNeal's newspaper
office or the domesticated apartment he shares with his wife, Northside
dramatically plunges us into the noir landscape when McNeal goes in
search of Wanda Skutnik in order to persuade her to recant her
identification. During these fifteen minutes, the camerawork in Northside
changes dramatically. Most of the scenes are done in night-for-night
shooting; characters' faces, including Stewart's, are shown only half-lit;
and physical space becomes much more restricted and, consequently, the
individual frames of the film become much tighter.
Although this noir-dominated series of scenes only lasts for fifteen
minutes in a film that spans nearly two hours, it resonates throughout the
remainder of the film, functioning like Northside's black hole.85 And,
indeed, it is the film's black hole, inhabited by a woman who refuses to
change her testimony for no given reason, and who will not provide
McNeal with any information whatsoever. Despite the film's confidence
in its own role in the establishment of truth and justice, for these fifteen
minutes Northside is pulled into a vortex that it must fight its way out of.
Providing that vortex is film noir's work; restoring viewers and the film
itself to the possibility of truth and effective social action is the work of
both classical film narrative and documentary. At this point, Northside
leaves noir safely behind and suggests to its viewers the practical need for
more certain, more scientific evidence.86 Like other films focused on
crime, Northside points to the aspirational possibility for alternatives to
the eyewitness, alternatives that seemed, in the 1940s, close on the
horizon. One of those alternatives, as we shall see next, was the lie
detector test.
But before we turn to this alternative form of evidence, it is important to
note that Northside's "noirish" treatment of Wanda Skutnik-its focus on
85. This kind of mini-incorporation of noir elements also occurs in Frank Capra's IT'S A
WONDERFUL LIFE (RKO 1946), during the scenes in which George Bailey must revisit his hometown
as if he were dead, and in Alfred Hitchcock's SHADOW OF A DOUBT (Universal 1942), where a scene
shot in a seedy, darkened bar seems almost like a violation of the rest of the film, which is brightly lit
and occurs mostly in domestic spaces.
86. Ironically, these "noirish" scenes, which are much more stylized than those of the rest of the
film, could also be read as the most realistic in that they call attention to the extreme poverty and
physical degradation that pervaded parts of Chicago. As Rosenberg points out, they "highlight the
sociocultural gulf between McNeal's and Wanda's worlds." Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 288.
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her silence, obstinacy, and perverse sense of complacency in letting a man
remain in jail long after, it seems, she could be threatened by the police-
means that we never find out in the film if or why Skutnik was forced to
lie on the stand. Nor does the film resolve an even bigger mystery: Who
actually killed the policeman that day in the speakeasy? The film leaves
that mystery (which was also never resolved in the actual case) alone, and
in doing so, admits that there are parts of the Wiecek case that cannot be
reenacted. The focus on Skutnik thus not only exposes the limitations of
eyewitness testimony but also makes clear that we may never entirely
know what "really" happened. In its quest to recover the past in an
authentic and credible fashion, Northside has to abandon its interest in
Skutnik at this point, leaving behind the thematic strain that most interests
film noir-the impossibility of ever recapturing the past-for the dubious
promises of the reenactment.
87
The Lie Detector Test
After Northside demonstrates so much skepticism about the reliability
of human testimony, the film turns to a machine as the next-and better-
means of providing evidence.88 As we will demonstrate, however, the
film's representation of the lie detector is marked by a certain degree of
ambiguity. If Northside seems confident in its stance on the unreliability
of eyewitness testimony, its position on the evidential value of the lie
detector is much more complicated-a fact that in some ways reflects the
larger history of the lie detector in courtroom procedures.
When McNeal asks Frank Wiecek if he would be willing to take a lie
detector test, the prisoner quickly agrees: "Mr. McNeal, for eleven years
I've been waiting for a chance to get at that box." McNeal emphasizes that
it's a dangerous bargain for Wiecek: "You know what you're up against?
If it turns out bad, you're cooked. If it turns out good, it's only Leonarde
Keeler's professional opinion. It doesn't count legally." But Wiecek is
87. Indeed, the elusiveness and mystery of one's past, or the past of others, haunts the majority of
film noir protagonists, including Jeff Bailey in Jacques Tourneur's Out of the Past, Rip Murdock in
John Cromwell's DEAD RECKONING (Columbia 1947), George Steele in Irving Reis's CRACK-UP
(1946), and Vincent Parry in Delmar Dave's DARK PASSAGE (Warner Brothers 1948).
88. Another film noir of this time period that makes interesting use of the lie detector is Joseph
Lewis's THE BIG COMBO (Security-Thedora 1955), also starring Richard Conte. In this film, Conte
plays Mr. Brown, a powerful mobster who continually outsmarts the detective, Leonard Diamond, on
his trail. No method employed by Diamond-harassment, surveillance, and an 18,000 dollar police-
force budget-successfully stops Brown's criminal activity until Diamond deploys a lie detector test.
During this test, Diamond utters a series of words/names to which Brown must automatically respond
with another word/name. While Brown remains calm, even cavalier, throughout most of this test, he
falters when he hears the name of a man whom he has managed to silence with money, a man who
could provide evidence of a murder Brown committed several years ago. Diamond triumphantly says,
"You can't lie with your blood pressure!" Thus, we know that the detective has finally found the one
method that, in however minor a way, has located Brown's vulnerability. Though this scene is
extremely brief, its revelation of Brown's vulnerability establishes a chain of discoveries that
ultimately ends with Diamond killing Brown as the latter resists arrest.
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determined, even eager, hoping that the test will persuade others of his
innocence. Back in his prison cell, he is warned of the dangers of the test
by another convict: "Listen kid, take it from me. Keep away from Keeler
and that lie detector .... Why, I had the cops, the state's attorney, even my
own lawyer believing me. Then they talked me into going against that
box." "What happened?" queried Wiecek. "What do you mean what
happened. I'm doing life, ain't I?" the prisoner replied. This brief
exchange, implying that the convict's attempt to fool authorities was
exposed by the lie detector, suggests that the machine can triumph over
even the most calculated performances. Given our supposition by this
point that Wiecek is telling the truth when he says that he is innocent, it
would seem that the scene is constructed so as to reassure viewers that the
test will work in Wiecek's favor.
Still, the scene is peculiarly unsettling, for while it appears to be
validating the lie detector as a conveyor of truth and justice, it also draws
our attention to the machine's potentially devastating and detached power.
The fact that the prisoner describes his experience as "going against that
box," for example, emphasizes both the seeming absence of a human
operator behind the machine as well as the prisoner's ignorance about how
the machine works. Cinematographically, this scene is also infused with
tension and a vague sense of foreboding, framed as it is in noir's low-key
lighting and with the camera lingering in close-up on Frank's anxious face
as he meditates on the prisoner's comments. We imagine what Frank must
be feeling: that this test could somehow work against him as it did for the
other prisoner; that once the machine renders its verdict, his words could
be forever discounted; that in one brief session, his fate could be
irrevocably decided.
The basic premise behind the polygraph test is that human beings have
physical responses to the stress of lying that are beyond their will and
control. The body can reveal the mind, and inner mental states can be
rendered visible, exposed by the machine.89 The lie detector continuously
measures the prisoner's blood pressure as he or she answers numerous
questions, both mundane and significant. The completed test results in a
graphic representation of the changes in blood pressure-rendering visible
someone's invisible internal states through the intervention of technology.
But this seemingly simple procedure belies a whole range of complex
questions. How ought one to read the transcript of the body? What do the
fluctuations in blood pressure mean? How does one translate the reflection
of physical processes to the underlying mental state?9" Eliciting meaning
89. See the discussion of the lie detector test in RONALD R. THOMAS, DETECTIVE FICTION AND
THE RISE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 21-39 (2000). Thomas traces the rudimentary beginnings of the
polygraph in the late nineteenth century, arguing that its development answered the cultural need for,
and anxiety over, making the human body readable.
90. Modem polygraphers have developed an elaborate set of approaches-including asking
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from a polygraph thus requires interpreters with specialized knowledge.
Yet, neither in the 1940s nor at present is there any regulated set of
credentials required for one to claim to be a polygraph expert, no
specifically mandated course of study nor any testing procedures to assure
competence.
Other issues have also made the use of lie detectors controversial. While
the test itself is straightforward enough, it rests on highly problematic
assumptions. The basic premise behind it is quite simple: Telling lies
creates stress or anxiety, and this stress or anxiety is echoed
physiologically and recorded on the polygraph. Untruths leave traces.91
The problem with this reasoning is that physiological responses that
suggest stress or anxiety may be generated by a number of factors, only
one of which is lying. Perhaps someone is made nervous merely by taking
the test. Perhaps the anxiety generated by the accusation is itself sufficient
to generate a physiological response that mimics that typically generated
by a liar. Perhaps some liars feel no anxiety and register no change in
physiological response even when they fail to tell the truth. The
physiological response measured by the polygraph can only record that
some response is taking place; it cannot determine the cause of that
response or its meaning without interpretation.
On several occasions, the film reminds its viewers that the lie detector is
not legitimate legal evidence-and indeed, even up to the present courts
have been quite reluctant to authorize lie detector tests as legal proof.92 In
suspects unusual and embarrassing "control" questions to gauge their physical responses or instructing
them to lie when asked a particular question or questions-to attempt to create test methods that can
provide secure knowledge. For a thorough discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the
polygraph today, compare David C. Raskins, Charles R. Honts & John C. Kirchner, The Scientific
Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case for Polygraph Tests, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 565 (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997), with William G. Iacono & David T. Lykken, The
Scientific Status of Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra, at 582.
91. The premises behind the polygraph test, in this sense, are strikingly similar to the premises
behind police uses of photography in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both in Britain and
America, the police took photographs of criminals and criminal suspects not only for identification
purposes but because it was still widely assumed in both these countries, thanks to the extraordinary
popularity of physiognomy as a mode of social science, that the physical features of a person revealed
his or her internal traits. Thus, if one studied the details of a photograph closely, one could "read" a
person's guilt or innocence in his or her face. In both photography and the lie detector, then, the body
betrays its owner. For contemporaneous examples of this belief in photography's revelatory powers,
see THOMAS BYRNES, PROFESSIONAL CRIMINALS OF AMERICA (1886); and CESARE LOMBROSO,
CRIMINAL MAN (1911). For the seminal discussion of this phenomenon, see Alan Sekula, The Body
and the Archive, in THE CONTEST OF MEANING: CRITICAL HISTORIES OF PHOTOGRAPHY 343, 348-52
(Richard Bolton ed., 1990).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998). In the last few years, however, there
has been a slight softening toward the polygraph in some jurisdictions, with some courts holding that
polygraphs ought to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis rather than presumed inadmissible. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 1997 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Posado, 47 F.3d 428 (5th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Glabreth, 908 F.
Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995); United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Ariz. 1995).
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fact, Frye v. United States,93 a 1923 case that remains influential as a
standard for approaching expert evidence even today, 94 examined the
admissibility of an early lie detector test. The judge determined that the lie
detector test was not yet sufficiently reliable to be used as legal evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. We think that the systolic blood
pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing. 95
In 1948, when Northside was released, courts typically based their
exclusion of lie detectors on a variety of arguments: The experiments were
still uncertain, the details of interpretation too murky, and the general
reliability of the test insufficiently established. On extremely rare
occasions, individual judges did permit such evidence. In one 1938 case,
for example, a judge allowed a polygraph into evidence, reasoning thus:
For hundreds of years our courts have deemed the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses in open court to be the best method so
far devised for the ascertainment of the truth .... It seems to me that
this pathometer and the technique by which it is used indicate a new
and more scientific approach to the ascertainment of truth in legal
investigations. 96
But this case was atypical, an outlier criticized and dismissed by other
judges.97 More generally, courts and legal commentators acknowledged
that if the lie detector were perfected, it would be a useful tool, but they
steadfastly asserted that its time had not yet arrived.98 However,
throughout the last half-century, courts have been noticeably more
stringent in applying this general acceptance standard to the polygraph
93. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
94. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court ruled that Frye
was not incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence. Nonetheless, Frye's test of "general
acceptance" remains one of the factors to which judges can look in determining the admissibility of
expert evidence, and a number of state courts have chosen to continue to use Frye as their standard for
admissibility even post-Daubert. See generally Heather G. Hamilton, The Movement from Frye to
Daubert: Where Do the States Stand, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201 (1998).
95. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
96. People v. Kenny, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1938).
97. See, e.g., People v. Forte, 4 N.Y.S.2d 913, 916 (1938) (rejecting Kenny's claim that there is
sufficient scientific basis for admitting the polygraph into evidence).
98. See, e.g., 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed.
1923) (declaring that "[i]f there is ever devised a psychological test for the valuation of witnesses, the
law will run to meet it," but also admonishing that "[t]here must first be proof of general scientific
recognition that [the test is] valid and feasible").
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than to numerous other forms of evidence. 99
Hence, the history of the lie detector's evidentiary status is fraught with
complications. The film never goes into these complications, other than to
refer to the detector's general exclusion from the courtroom. Since these
difficulties with the polygraph are largely absent from the film, the legal
system's refusal to accept the polygraph as legitimate evidence seems
somewhat odd in Northside, even perverse. Just as the film offers no
compelling explanation for the speakeasy owner's refusal to tell the truth
(and thereby seems to be an indictment of eyewitness testimony in
general), the film provides no explanation for the legal system's reluctance
to embrace the lie detector test. As represented in the film, the lie detector
is entirely reliable, so its unreliability cannot serve as an explanation for
its exclusion from trials. In fact, it is the polygraph that persuades
McNeal: It is precisely at this point in the film that the reporter's
skepticism is transformed into full-fledged conviction, his wavering belief
in Wiecek's innocence now a matter of faith. The film invites its viewers
to ask how the courtroom's exclusion of such technologies of truth can be
justified.
Implicitly, the suggestion is that the lie detector is too threatening-it
provides a technology for truth-detection more effective and more
efficient than the legal system's reliance on the jury can ever be. It must
be kept out precisely because it threatens to replace the trial process
altogether, substituting trial by jury for trial by machine. It is the lie
detector's potential as pure technology, therefore, that makes it a
problematic form of evidence-for the judges, attorneys, and arguably for
the film viewers themselves. For while the film represents the lie detector
as reliable and accurate, and the legal system as antiquated and myopic in
rejecting it as evidence, Northside's representation of the lie detector is
nevertheless constructed in such a way as to mystify its functions and
epistemological assumptions. This mystification effectively distances
viewers from the very machine they are apparently being encouraged to
admire, instilling in them a mistrust of its scientific complexity, and
therefore, its inaccessibility.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the elaborate, eight-minute scene
in which Wiecek takes the test, a scene that demonstrates a peculiar
remoteness from the instrument it spotlights. Interestingly, the scene
begins in medias res. As a close-up shows us the machine's intricate
wiring and gauges, we can hear the voice of someone who sounds like a
highly knowledgeable person explaining to McNeal how the machine
works. The voice is actually that of Leonarde Keeler, an inventor and
advocate of the lie detector, who plays himself on-screen. In fact, it was
Keeler himself who had administered Majczek's actual lie detector test,
99. For the continued contemporary debate over the reliability of the polygraph, see the
competing perspectives offered in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 90.
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concluding both in the actual case and on the screen that the test strongly
suggested that the man who had spent more than a decade in prison was
telling the truth when he denied any involvement in the crime for which he
was convicted. Keeler's appearance in the film thus helps to invest the
machine with particular authority, while simultaneously lending the film
an even greater documentary aura through this bit of verisimilitude.
°°
Keeler's undoubted expertise also allows the film to skirt around the
obvious issue of interpretation and the human mistakes that can potentially
come with it. By having Keeler administer the test, the viewers are
apparently assured that the reading will be fair and accurate, that the
polygraphist brings both integrity and knowledge to the examination. If
Wiecek is the author of the text, in that it is produced by his body, its
interpretation is authorized by Keeler, whose expert judgment cannot be
questioned.
At the same time, however, Keeler's presence in the film ultimately
reinforces the film's tendency to mystify the functions of the lie detector.
This is evident in several ways, including the fact that, as noted earlier, we
only hear part of his explanation to McNeal about how the lie detector
operates because the scene begins in media res. Moreover, the mise-en-
scene repeatedly draws our visual attention to the machine rather than to
Keeler, with individual shots framed to place a fragmented figure of
Keeler in the background (with only his lower torso visible) while the
machine itself looms large in the foreground. The relationship between
sound and image is also striking in this sequence of shots, since Keeler's
voice is both monotone and jargon-filled; his explanation to McNeal refers
to such scientific concepts as "the electrical conductivity of the skin" and
"the systolic measurements of the heart." His voice does not attract our
interest: What does attract our interest is the spectacle of the machine
itself.
In making the workings of the lie detector so visible to viewers, then,
the film manages both to enlighten and to mystify us about the machine.
We hear Keeler's explanation to McNeal, we hear him ask questions of
Wiecek and we hear Wiecek answer them, we watch the machine produce
its graph as the two men talk, but we cannot understand how the machine
is interpreting the exchange. We observe carefully, aided by the camera's
frequent close-ups, but this privileged entry into the production site of the
lie detector tells us very little about the machine itself. Nor do Keeler's
explanatory comments provide much guidance.
As Keeler administers the test, McNeal, his boss, and the prison warden
100. Some critics of dramadocs and reenactments have singled out for particular criticism the use
of small, seemingly genuine details (such as an actor's replication of a real person's mannerisms or the
participation of an actual participant) to give the film the semblance of authenticity: 'Falseness of
gesture and falseness of appearance drive authenticity from docudramas. This is why those who
admire these forms of dramatic life find the most trivial touches of verisimilitude so entrancing." Jerry
Kuehl, Lies About Real People, in WHY DOCUDRAMA, supra note 67, at 119, 122.
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all watch from behind a window that allows them to see but prevents them
from hearing the questions or answers, and the viewers assume this
vantage point for a brief period of time as well. This spectatorial
foregrounding dramatizes the cinematic dimensions to the scene, which,
by placing such stress on instruments and instrumentality, invites a
comparison between the lie detector and those of the camera.' Like the
lie detector, the camera provides its own recording of Wiecek's physical
responses as he answers the questions, focusing on the heaving of his
chest, the inadvertent moving of his fingers, the sighs he emits as he
answers, and the sweat on his face and hands. Yet, while only Keeler can
understand the graphics produced on the white sheet of paper, viewers can
read Wiecek's emotional response simply by watching carefully. While
the lie detector needs an intermediary to interpret its signs, film does not.
To some degree, the film thus spotlights the lie detector so as to
undermine its technology as inferior to its own-inferior, that is, because
it is too sophisticated, too scientific, too inaccessible, and, finally, too
visible. One could argue, in other words, that the decision to show viewers
the scene of the lie detector's production serves the ulterior purpose of
masking the film's own site of production. As a wide range of critics have
discussed, classical narrative film depends on the invisibility of its
mechanisms; its success, in other words, hinges on its own transparency-
on the illusion of effortlessness with which it seems to give us its recreated
world." 2 By visualizing the mechanisms of the lie detector test, in all their
complex and mystifying glory, Northside simultaneously maintains its
own status as a transparent medium onto a "real" world-one that needs
no intermediary, no agent.
These observations become especially interesting in light of cultural
historian of science Bruno Latour's arguments about how science gets
made and disseminated. According to Latour, scientific findings are
generated through the use of instruments that create visual displays of
various sorts, graphs, charts, gauges, and so on, or what Latour terms
"inscription devices. '13 Latour argues that scientific truths are made
persuasive precisely through a reliance on these inscription devices: They
make it appear as if the viewer, whether fellow scientist or layperson, sees
101. Another fascinating example of a film that spotlights the workings of the lie detector so as to
draw attention to its own epistemological status is the much more recent movie, THE POLYGRAPH
(Cinea 1996). The opening scene of the film begins with a lie detector test in operation. At the end of
the test, the polygraphist informs the suspect that the "results were inconclusive"-a phrase that is
repeated several times. As the film progresses, we learn that while the suspect is not guilty of the
murder, his intense hatred of the victim and his past behavior toward her complicate his innocence.
This revelation is not straightforwardly given in the film's narrative; rather, it comes through a series
of intricate visual clues. Hence, the inherent properties and functions of the film's camera perform the
same role as the lie detector, rendering the "results" of a close investigation of the protagonist
"inconclusive."
102. See, e.g., DAVID A. COOK, A HISTORY OF NARRATIVE FILM, (2d ed. 1990).
103. BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION 68 (1987)
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the results for herself, while the scientific author "behaves as if he or she
were [just] the mouthpiece of what is inscribed on the window of the
instrument."'104 The viewer's confrontation with the instruments that
produce these inscriptions-gauges, meters, physiographs, and all the
other instruments of the modern laboratory-is, according to Latour, an
"audio-visual spectacle" that generates "conviction." That is to say, visual
inscriptions and verbal commentary are far more persuasive in tandem
than either would be alone. 105 But this seeming attempt to make science
accessible turns out to mystify its processes even further, since very few
people can actually make sense of the inscriptions they are viewing, or
even the verbal explanations that accompany them.
Although the lie detector test does not figure into Latour's discussion,
its representation in Northside certainly provides an excellent example of
the type of inscriptions he analyzes. Viewers see in close-up the graph the
lie detector produces, but we have no comprehension of what it means,
nor do we fully understand the explanatory words offered by Keeler. Our
technological and scientific ignorance is precisely why, the film implies,
we need an alternative form of evidence-one that everybody can make
sense of and understand, or at least believe that they can. And, hence, the
film makes a climactic shift to the final form of evidence it explores: the
photograph.
When the film elevates photography as the most accessible and
therefore most valuable form of legal evidence, its own self-promotion is
thus cemented, as we shall see next. Photography becomes Northside's
means of selling its own supposedly simple and simplifying technology.
Like classical narrative film, photography also depends on the invisibility
of its site of production; it presents itself as natural transcript, ready and
waiting to be read and interpreted without need of expert assistance or
explanation. And, unlike the lie detector test, which can record only
present history as it charts the body's immediate responses to questions in
the here-and-now, photography's supposed capturing of the past also
means that Northside has finally arrived at the form of evidence that, like
itself, aspires to reenactment.
The Photograph
In the last quarter of the film, Northside explores a third kind of
104. Id. at 71.
105. Id. Much of Latour's study focuses on the role of the "black box," which, according to him,
is a device whose accurate functioning can be taken for granted, a device believed to "work" so that
the user need only be concerned with what is put into the box and what is taken out, rather than what
goes on inside it. See id. at 2-3, 131-32. According to Latour, to challenge seemingly established
science, one inevitably begins to open these black boxes and peer inside. See id. at 29. Although he
does not discuss it specifically, the lie detector, as it is presented in the film, functions as a perfect
example of the "black box," while legal decisions questioning the machine's authority present an
example of how the "black box" can be re-opened and contested.
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evidence that lacks the defects of the first two, a kind that is portrayed as
both reliable and legally legitimate. The photograph is the film's
"solution" to the evidentiary conundrum. Unlike the lie detector, the
photograph is permitted within legal processes. Unlike an eyewitness, the
photograph is trustworthy. The existence of the photograph thus provides
the critical evidence that guarantees that Frank Wiecek will go free, the
evidence that can force the pardon board to recognize and rectify the grave
injustice of Wiecek's conviction for murder. 106
As photographic historian John Tagg has argued, assumptions about
photographic veracity have little to do with the "natural" qualities of the
photograph.17 Rather, they have been produced and sustained by
discursive systems aimed at advancing the authority of certain institutions
or forces-such as the media, the penal system, the law, and more
specifically, the documentary movement that began in the 1920s. "That a
photograph can come to stand as evidence, for example, rests not on a
natural or existential fact, but on a social, semiotic process," claims Tagg.
But in Northside, the photograph's evidentiary status is also hard-
won.108 The first mention of a photograph occurs late in the film, when
McNeal explains to his employers and the Chicago Times attorney that he
has unearthed a photo from the files of the Times's former rival, and now
defunct, newspaper, The Herald Examiner. The photograph depicts a
handcuffed Wiecek walking into the police station; in the background is
the owner of the speakeasy, Wanda Skutnik, who testified that she saw
Wiecek for the first time since the murder when she identified him in a
police line-up on December 23. The photograph offers proof that Skutnik
was lying, McNeal believes, because he assumes that the picture was
taken before the time of the lineup. McNeal is thrilled with his discovery,
certain that he has found the critical piece of evidence that will cement
Wiecek's claim of innocence.
The attorney dismisses some of McNeal's evidence as inadequate,
telling him, "Look here McNeal, I'm an attorney. I know what it is to go
up in front of the pardon board. They go on facts." McNeal answers,
106. In this way, Northside provides a similar view of photography to that found in other noir
documentaries. Henry Hathaway's The House on 92nd Street and Anthony Mann's He Walked by
Night, for example, represent photographically based technologies such as surveillance cameras as
invincible, modern forms of detection. In this sense, noir documentaries differ radically from other
films noir, which tend to treat photography with much more skepticism. In films ranging from Steve
Sekely's THE SCAR (Bryan Foy Productions 1948) to Edward Dmytryk's Murder, My Sweet, the
photograph is presented as a highly unreliable piece of evidence. In direct contrast to the strategy of
Northside, these types of film noir focus on the misleading nature of photographic images as a means
of drawing attention to their own visual unreliability. For other examples of this pattern, see Fritz
Lang's Beyond a Reasonable Doubt and Edwin L. Marin's NOCTURNE (RKO 1946).
107. JOHN TAGG, THE BURDEN OF REPRESENTATION: ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHIES AND
HISTORIES 7 (1988).
108. Rosenberg makes the important point that McNeal demonstrates unequivocal faith in
technology while the attorneys in the film are at first quite dubious about the photograph's evidentiary
status. See Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 286.
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"Facts, okay, I'll give you something better than facts. I'll give you a
picture." ' 9 He presents the photograph to the attorney, who takes a quick
glance at it, looks to see if anything is written on the back, and hands it
back to McNeal, explaining that the photo is useless without a date-
without some kind of self-positioning device that could verify its exact
moment in history and thus legitimize its documentary status.l1 ° Deflated,
McNeal folds the picture and puts it away in his vest pocket.
In this particular scene, Hathaway's pedestrian camerawork, consisting
entirely of medium shots, underscores the photo's status as object rather
than symbolic image.11 Seen through the eyes of an attorney whose tough,
dismissive attitude is intended to influence our response, the photograph
does not compel. As viewers of a film with documentary impulses, we
may wish to side with McNeal, but we necessarily wind up on the side of
the attorney, realizing that without a date, the photo cannot fulfill its
documentary role. Until it is linked to a particular moment in time, this
photograph means nothing.
The photograph then disappears from the film's plot until the day that
the pardon board is due to convene to consider Wiecek's fate. Even
though McNeal is absolutely certain of Wiecek's innocence, he is resigned
to defeat before the pardon board, for he lacks the sort of proof that counts
legally. But then, riding in a taxi, he happens upon a headline on the front
page of a newspaper describing a "police enlargement process."' 12 The
109. This is precisely the stand that the film ends up taking: Pictures are better than facts, or,
more precisely, pictures are the best possible way to prove contested facts.
110. This is also in direct contrast with many noir films' treatment of photography, which tend to
use elaborate close-up shots and montages to draw our attention to the physical and symbolic
properties. Emphasis on the importance of the date and context recalls Barthes's observations about
the function of the photographic caption, which, according to him, guides our vision, even to the
extent that "sometimes ... the text produces (invents) an entirely new signified which is retroactively
projected into the image." ROLAND BARTHES, IMAGE-MUSIC-TEXT 27 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977).
111. This dismissive treatment of the photograph contrasts sharply with most representations of
photography in classic film noirs. In Robert Siodmak's The File on Thelma Jordan, for example, a
district attorney jeopardizes his professional career by falling in love with and helping a murder
suspect, Thelma Jordan, whom he believes to be innocent. In a dramatic moment that utilizes a zoom
lens and a series of increasing close-ups, the lawyer discovers a photo of Jordan as a former prostitute
in the police files and realizes for the first time that the woman he thought he knew is not what she
seems. The photograph fills the entire screen, its evidentiary status in effect displacing for both the
betrayed attorney and the film viewers a former impression of Jordan-one carefully constructed by
the film's cinematography-as a respectable, naive, and sincere young woman. Paradoxically, then,
the police photograph, magnified by Siodmak's camera, offers us a new image of Jordan that
possesses far more potency than any previously offered by the film. Watching a film noir, viewers
may be seduced by the seeming potency of the photographic image, forgetting about dates, context,
and general reliability, but within the perimeter of a quasi-documentary, we are forced to adopt a much
more critical stance.
112. To our knowledge, no new enlarging processes had been invented around the time of the
film that would have made news headlines. Although photographs can, in fact, be enlarged by 1000%
as the film suggests, the resulting image would almost certainly have been much too grainy for any
details to appear clearly. Thus, the film's representation of this technique is quite exaggerated. A
relevant discussion may be found in MoRRiS GURRiE, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF ENLARGING 19-21
(1949), which was published only one year after Northside was released.
34
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol13/iss2/1
Mnookin & West
previously useless photograph now has the potential to assume vital
importance, as McNeal hurries down to a police photo lab and begs the
technician to enlarge it as quickly as possible. He hopes that the process
will reveal the date of a newspaper held by a newspaper boy in the far left
comer of the photo, which would determine the date of the photo's origin
and thus possibly offer conclusive evidence that Wanda Skutnik was
lying. Wiecek's fate thus comes to rest not on the photo itself, but upon
the use of a technology that may allow the photograph to "speak." Note,
too, the charmingly self-referential twist here: Not only does McNeal find
the key to proving Wiecek's innocence by reading a newspaper headline,
but within the photograph itself it is a newspaper that may provide the
reporter with the evidence he needs to persuade the parole board.
After making the request of the technician, McNeal travels to
Springfield, the state capitol, to plead with the pardon board to wait for the
enlarged photograph over the AP wire as it is sent from Chicago's police
headquarters. In the film's most dramatic scene, six members of the
pardon board-along with the film's actual viewers-wait in a state of
suspense for the enlarged image to appear. Hathaway sets the scene in a
photo lab, the scientific look of the police laboratory lending an
authoritative aura to the process. The board members, not up-to-date on
the latest procedures for enlarging photographs, listen intently to
McNeal's explanation of what the enlargement process can do-that it can
magnify an area of a photograph to many times the original size and that
the quality of the resultant image will depend on such variables as the
"condition of the dup. negative" and the "density of the print." McNeal
also tells the board that he's been "praying, too."
As we gaze into the solution bath, the image slowly starts to appear. The
film's camera zooms in on the image as it develops, mirroring the
enlargement process itself. The cinematic close-up and the enlargement
process thus combine to make visible what had previously been left
invisible, enacting Walter Benjamin's observation that "[t]he enlargement
of a snapshot does not simply render more precise what in any case was
visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new structural formations of the
subject.""l 3 Through this dazzling and extended scene of development, the
photograph is transformed from worthless to indispensable: Locating it
temporally transforms it into the most reliable of witnesses. As Benjamin
explains, the enlargement process has not simply made the image "more
precise." The photograph's original subject-Wanda Skutnik and Frank
Wiecek entering the police station-is now recast, and the photograph
now has a new subject: time itself, verifiable and irrefutable history. The
film's enlargement of the photograph, in other words, functions as a kind
of reenactment, allowing for a revisiting and reinterpretation of the site of
113. WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 217, 236 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1968).
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the original image. No longer is the photo just an image of an inscrutable
instant. Now it can be placed within a narrative context. Like a single
frame pulled from a film, it is one moment captured, but it is now a
moment with a clear before and after.' 14
Once the critical date is revealed, everyone-McNeal, the parole board,
and the film viewer-knows that Frank Wiecek will go free. No one
doubts the authority of the photograph. Even the attorney opposing the
prisoner's pardon is silenced by the evidence of the photograph.
Moreover, the photograph is portrayed as the exclusive form of evidence
that can cross between the various arenas of proof. It is valid both within
legal processes and outside of them. In the film, then, the eyewitness is
authoritative in the legal setting, but unreliable; the lie detector is
authoritative outside the courtroom but irrelevant within it. Only the
photograph is capable of commanding authority across domains, equally
trustworthy in the theater of the courtroom and in the theaters of the 1940s
presenting Northside. It is effective, it would seem, precisely because it
lacks the totalizing power of the polygraph-it does not threaten to
displace legal process altogether, but only to check it by tempering human
judgment with mechanical objectivity. The photograph links together legal
proof with lay conceptions of evidence; in both realms, it can be deemed
persuasive, legitimate, even dispositive. The photograph not only saves
Frank Wiecek, but it redeems legal proof as well, by showing that in the
end, legal evidence can suffice to bring the truth to light." 5
Moreover, this climactic scene, in which the enlarged photograph
becomes visible before our eyes (note, here, that the film's audience and
the film's characters all view the newly legible photograph together),
serves a critical purpose within the film. By presenting the photograph as
utterly authoritative, this scene warrants that we can believe what we see.
In this sense, the photograph is a stand-in for the film itself. The authority
of the mechanically produced visual image is maintained in a double
sense: The truth of the photograph affirms the truth of the film as a whole.
114. Looking at a film still, for Roland Barthes, takes place at a divide--at a point where the
image, or our perception of the image, undergoes a transformation. Liberated from the narrative
impulse of the film, the still nevertheless retains the illusion of movement. Barthes calls this "the
possibility of configuration," the "armature of a permutational unfolding." BARTHES, supra note 110,
at 77.
115. But note that while the photograph assures that Frank Wiecek will receive justice, it certainly
does not completely exculpate the legal system. The existence of the photograph, that McNeal was
able to locate it, that he serendipitously discovered in the cab that it might be possible to have it
sufficiently enlarged, and that he was able to find someone who could enlarge it quickly enough in
order to reveal the crucial date on the newspaper, are all portrayed as contingent facts, lucky breaks.
The photograph might never have been found; or McNeal might never have realized its significance.
Without it, Frank Wiecek might well have remained in prison. So Wiecek's release from prison does
not turn Northside into a "justice will win out" morality tale; rather, we continue to see how fragile
and accidental the rendering of justice can be. Still, the fact that the parole board does respond to the
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Just as the members of the parole board can believe in the authority of the
enlarged photograph, the members of the audience can believe in the
authority of Northside's retelling of a true crime tale. According to the
film, both the photograph and the film itself can be trusted.
Whatever Northside wishes us to believe, however, neither documentary
films nor photographs are inherently trustworthy. In fact, Northside's
conflation of documentary film and authoritative photograph is an
interesting one, in part because the very device that affirms the film's
realism turns out to be pure fiction: In the actual Majczek case, there was
no photographic evidence, no visual image that helped to secure the
actual defendant's release. Rather, in the actual case, though the evidence
was compelling, it was murkier and more circumstantial-hardly the stuff
out of which film climaxes are made. The film's representation of the
photograph as an authoritative means for truthtelling thus turns in on itself
ironically, revealing the fabrication of both film and photograph alike. The
Majczek case received a great deal of media attention-in addition to the
Chicago Daily Times's nearly daily reports, the case got attention from the
national press and magazines like Time and Newsweek.116 Many of
Northside's viewers thus certainly had some previous knowledge of the
facts of the case itself, and may even have recognized the irony of the
fictionalized climax.
This use of a "fictional" photograph necessarily challenges the film's
own claim to be something other than "fiction," suggesting that in the end,
drama or narrative impact outweighs any concern for verisimilitude. (And
why not?-it is a Hollywood film, after all.) For those viewers who had
closely followed the actual Majczek case, those who eagerly read the
actual articles in the Chicago Daily Times, this use of a photograph is a
kind of a nod and a wink, a gesture to say "Okay, we admit it. Reality isn't
quite dramatic enough for film even when reality is at its most dramatic."
Genre makes demands that reality cannot live up to.
This takes us back, once again to the question of certainty." 7 The film
seeks to offer a form of proof-both to the parole board and to the
viewers-that would eliminate all doubt about Wiecek's innocence. In so
doing, the film carries its viewers from doubt to assurance as the narrative
progresses: from the mother's faith, to the reporter's polygraph-inspired
conviction, to the eventual knowledge that Wiecek is in fact innocent
beyond a shadow of a doubt. The photograph turns the mother's faith and
McNeal's justified belief into certain knowledge. And yet, ironically, this
certainty is built atop a fiction.
It is interesting, however, to recognize how narrowly Northside
circumscribes its turn to fiction. We can imagine, for a moment, some of
116. See, e.g., National Affairs: Illinois, TIME, Aug. 27, 1945, at 23.
117. For discussion of the relation between faith and certainty in the film, see supra Section ll.B.
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the other ways that the film could have provided dispositive proof of
Wiecek's innocence. Most obviously, McNeal's digging might have
uncovered the actual perpetrator, necessarily exculpating Wiecek.
Alternatively, McNeal might have located another eyewitness to the
murder-someone who saw it all, and who could therefore confirm that
Wiecek was the wrong guy. Or Wanda Skutnik might have recanted her
original testimony, admitting that she had indeed perjured herself out of
fear that the police would have arrested her for bootlegging had she failed
to identify Wiecek as the guilty man. This list could, of course, go on. Had
the film offered any of these forms of proof of Wiecek's innocence, it
would have been manufacturing evidence that did not exist in the actual
case, just as it did with the photograph. (In point of fact, in the actual case,
Majczek's release marked the first time in the state of Illinois that a
convicted man was pardoned even without an alternate suspect for the
crime.)
But although there was no photograph in the actual Majczek case, the
photograph manufactured by the film did not itself manufacture evidence
absent from the actual case. The photograph showed Skutnik and Wiecek
together outside the courthouse the day before Skutnik's identification of
Wiecek. The photograph proved, therefore, that when Skutnik said under
oath that she had not seen Wiecek at any time between the day of the
murder and the day she identified him in the police station, she was lying.
The substance of what was suggested by the photograph was, in fact,
suggested by the evidence in the actual case as well. In the actual case, the
reporters found Majczek's original arrest slip, and it was dated one day
prior to Walush's identification. 1 8 Why didn't Walush see Majczek for
purposes of identification the very day of the arrest? The one-day delay
suggested the plausibility of-though obviously did not prove-Majczek's
claim that Walush saw him several times and had to be pressured by the
police into making identifying him.
So the photograph did not offer proof that differed in substance from
evidence in the actual case, but only evidence that differed in
representational form. Instead of merely having Majczek's say-so,
corroborated by slight circumstantial evidence, to suggest that Skutnik
was lying, the photograph established the same thing in starker, less
contestable form. The fiction of the photograph, then, is merely a fiction
of form: The contents of the photograph are consistent with what
happened in the actual case, but no photograph ever emerged to operate as
a "silent witness" to corroborate and confirm Majczek's story.
But the closer we look at the photograph, the less certain it appears. All
that the picture actually depicts is people walking in and out of the
courthouse. The blown-up newspaper, transmitted almost magically across
118. McPhaul & McGuire, supra note 42.
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space to take us back in time, situates the photograph as having been taken
in a particular and critical moment. It does show that Wanda Skutnik was
lying when she said she had never seen Wiecek before identifying him,
but Skutnik's lie is not necessarily inconsistent with Wiecek's guilt. It
could be that Skutnik lied and Wiecek was guilty: The one in no way
precludes the other. Indeed, the mere fact that Skutnik had in fact seen
Wiecek prior to her December 23 identification of him does not even
prove that her identification of Wiecek as the murderer was incorrect.
The photograph thus impeaches Skutnik's credibility by contradiction,
showing by extrinsic evidence that her testimony was inaccurate, at least
in one particular. Note that the film has in fact already suggested the
importance of contradiction to the evaluation of credibility by both the
police and the jury: It was partly Wiecek's own contradictions about
minor matters that led to his arrest and subsequent conviction. Now,
however, the viewer is supposed to believe that Wiecek's contradictions
meant nothing; they were innocent mistakes or trivial mistruths deriving
from the pressure of interrogation: As Wiecek explained to McNeal,
"When they question you hour after hour, you're bound to get mixed up
on a lot of little things, the way I did." Skutnik's contradiction, by
contrast, is seen to be positive proof of her perjury. While the film entirely
elides the difficult question of when and to what extent inconsistency
should impeach credibility, it is true that if Skutnik is discredited, the
evidence linking Wiecek to the murder, already gossamer, dissolves
entirely. Skutnik's identification was the only substantial proof against
Wiecek: Without it, there is no longer sufficient evidence to justify a
belief in Wiecek's guilt. In the actual Majczek case, the reporters
interviewed some of the jurors who had decided Majczek's fate. All of
those interviewed claimed that had they been informed about some of
what the Chicago Daily Times had managed to dig up, they never would
have convicted Majczek in the first place.119 Certainly had such a
photograph been displayed to the original jury, the probability of
Majczek's conviction would have decreased substantially.
And yet, powerful though the photograph's attack on Wanda Skutnik's
credibility may be, the proof offered by the photograph is much more
circumstantial and attenuated than the film makes it out to be. It does not
in fact speak for itself, but rather requires a context in order to be
understood. 20 Only by understanding why the date matters can we
119. McPhaul & McGuire, supra note 43.
120. Because of the frequent testimonial use to which photographs are put, photography is often
described as possessing narrative qualities. But the crucial element in any narrative is agency, which,
in the case of the photograph, may be located in the viewer. The viewer of any discovered photo may
endow the image with storytelling abilities. According to Barthes, the most compelling photographs
are those that resist the viewer's imposition of a narrative through their "stupidity"-their refusal to
"speak." ROLAND BARTHES, CAMERA LUCIDA 9 (1980). For other discussions of the relation between
photography and narrative, see W.J.T. MITCHELL, PICTURE THEORY: ESSAYS ON VERBAL AND
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appreciate the significance of the date revealed on the front page of the
newspaper. The movement from the photograph to a belief in Wiecek's
innocence requires the viewer to make a chain of inferences. Placed into a
broader narrative, the photograph shows that Wanda Skutnik's testimony
was inaccurate; however, the viewer must therefore infer that her
inaccuracy was intentional, a lie rather than a misunderstanding or an
honest mistake, and then further infer that a witness who lied about this
detail cannot be believed when she identifies Wiecek as the guilty man.
Alternatively, the viewer might infer that Skutnik's inaccuracy may have
been inadvertent, but that a witness who misremembers whether she had
previously seen the suspect cannot be trusted when she claims to
remember his identity from the crime scene itself. The point is that
although the miraculously enlarged photograph does impeach Skutnik's
credibility, it does not, when analyzed carefully, speak dispositively about
Wiecek's innocence. The film, however, treats it as if it does, as if the
photograph makes Frank Wiecek's innocence self-evident.12'
The film's resolution of the evidentiary conundrum is problematic from
another angle as well. In fact, in actual courtrooms, the photograph lacked
the clear-cut authority granted to it in the film. The photographic image
had never been granted the legal status of irrefutable proof that the film
suggests. Rather, from the time of their earliest use in the 1850s and
1860s, photographs had often provoked an ambivalent response on the
part of judges, who saw them as offering potentially compelling evidence
and simultaneously feared the very vividness of their displays.122 This
VISUAL REPRESENTATION (1994); and ROLAND BARTHES, The Photographic Message, in IMAGE-
MUSIC-TEXT, supra note 110, at 15.
121. Barry Scheck and his co-authors make similar claims for properly administered DNA tests,
claims that are, on their face, much more plausible than Northside's claims about the photograph. See,
e.g., DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 18, at 92 (calling DNA tests "indisputable proof"). But
note that even DNA profiling does not necessarily prove innocence or stand outside the narratives
produced at trial: For example, the lack of a DNA match may just show that another party was present
as well, in addition to the defendant. And proof, even DNA evidence, is almost never "indisputable";
the acquittal of O.J. Simpson (in which Scheck himself was one of the defendant's attorneys), for
example, shows how significant quantities of DNA evidence found at the crime scene may be
explained in ways consistent with innocence. It is worth remembering that a critical piece of evidence
in the civil suit against Simpson was, in fact, a series of photographs: images of Simpson wearing
Bruno Magli shoes, the Lorenzo model, at a football game. (Bloody treadmarks from Bruno Magli
shoes, the Lorenzo model, in Simpson's size, were found at the scene of the crime, and only 299 pairs
of such shoes in the proper size were sold in the United States, and Simpson had denied owning any
such shoes.) For the testimony on this photograph and its authenticity, see, for example, the transcripts
from the civil trial of O.J. Simpson for Dec. 18 and Dec. 20, 1996, available at http://
www.courttv.com/casefiles/simpson/transcripts/dec/dec I 8.html; http://www.courttv.com/casefiles/
simpson/transcripts/dec/dec20.html. Like the photograph in Northside, this image (if believed to be
authentic) showed that a witness's statements were incorrect (in this case Simpson's testimony that he
had never owned Bruno Magli shoes). The photograph did not, of course, prove that Simpson
murdered Nicole Brown Simpson; it simply showed that one of Simpson's testimonial claims was
mistaken. Nonetheless, while we cannot know for certain, it seems likely that this photograph, by
challenging Simpson's credibility, played a significant role in the jury's finding of liability.
122. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of
Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 53-59 (1998).
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ambivalent response to the photograph was part of a much broader judicial
ambivalence toward technologically-produced ways of knowing that both
promised and threatened to provide authoritative knowledge-and thus
both promised and threatened to eliminate human judgment from the
process of legal fact-finding. (The judicial reluctance to allow the
polygraph, as we have seen, also reflects this ambivalence.)
In the case of the photograph as evidence, the judicial response to this
ambivalence was to construct a doctrine that deemed the photograph to be
mere illustration, rather then independent proof. 23 Photographs were
understood to be the depiction of an eyewitness in visual form, rather than
substantive evidence in and of itself. 124 This doctrine meant that in order to
use a photograph, it first had to be "authenticated" by someone who had
first-hand personal knowledge of that which was represented in the image.
A witness had, in essence, to claim the photograph as his or her own
testimony in visual form. Photographs were not generally permitted to
serve as "silent witnesses"-they could be used as evidence only when
they had a testimonial sponsor, some witness who claimed to have seen
whatever was depicted.125
A photograph found in a newspaper archive, taken long ago by an
unidentified and hence unavailable photographer, enlarged to reveal
details unknown to any human being, would, therefore, not have been
permitted into evidence by most judges.'26 While Northside suggests that
the photograph can be the evidentiary form that retains its authority both
for the everyday man on the street 127 and within the legal sphere, in fact,
the photograph that provided the definitive evidence in the film would
have been excluded, like the polygraph, from many courtrooms.
1 28
What is most striking about the use of the photograph in Northside is
just how comfortable, how sanguine, the film seems to be about its
123. Id. at 43-45.
124. See, e.g, 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE, § 790 (1st
ed. 1904).
125. Mnookin, supra note 122, at 43-45.
126. The on-the-ground realities were more complicated. Although doctrinally, photographs were
understood as merely illustration, in fact, as courts sometimes recognized, they were, once admitted,
also treated as if they had independent probative value. See id at 47-50. However, it was only with the
advent of the x-ray that judges had to construct grounds for admissibility that emphasized that the
authority of visual evidence might come from the process by which it was made rather than because of
authentication by a witness. On the important shift that occurred with the rise of x-ray evidence, see
Jennifer Mnookin, Images of Truth: Evidence, Expertise and Technologies of Knowledge in the
American Courtroom 367-404 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T.) (on file with M.I.T.
Library and with the author).
127. Given Northside's gendered conception of proof, we use "man" advisedly. See supra note
72.
128. This of course does not mean that it would have been excluded from a Board of Pardons
hearing, where the formal rules of evidence that govern trials would not in fact have applied. But
Northside makes no distinction between the evidence that might be received in different legal settings,
and generally constructs "legal evidence" and "evidence admissible in court" as equivalent.
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authority. In stark contrast to most noir films that examine the meaning or
truth-value of the photograph, Northside urges no cautions regarding the
photograph in particular, nor technologically produced knowledge more
generally. 129 Rather, the film celebrates and even glorifies technological
processes as offering privileged access to truth, access even (as with the
polygraph) to the seemingly impenetrable interiors of the human mind.
The film archly criticizes the legal system for resisting these technologies,
for failing to recognize that they are superior to the imperfect and
corruptible lay eyewitness who reports what she allegedly saw. 130
As a reenactment, Northside's claims to epistemological authority are
necessarily precarious, and it is the photograph that acts as a warrant,
warranting that we can indeed believe what we see. The photograph
becomes a stand-in for the film itself: The authority of the photograph
buttresses the authority of the film. And at the plot level, the photograph
quashes all dissent, carrying every reasonable viewer inexorably toward
the conclusion that Frank Wiecek is innocent. It is the photograph alone,
among all the forms of evidence displayed in the film, that can compel
conviction by operating as legitimate evidence both within the legal arena
and outside of it.
In the end, however, it is precisely the film's strong realist claims that
undermine its defense of machine-made knowledge. For as we have seen,
the crowning moment of technological triumph, the development of the
photograph that confirms a man's innocence and persuades doubters, is a
fiction. By turning to a blatant fiction at the most critical moment of the
film, Northside undermines its own authority, revealing that in fact its own
representation of the case cannot necessarily be trusted. This climactic
scene manifests the disjunction between seeming real and being real, the
tension between verisimilitude and evidence. These tensions in turn
rehabilitate the legal system's hesitation and ambivalence regarding
technologically-produced forms of evidence, a hesitation borne, in part,
precisely out of the fear that machine-produced vision risks looking more
real than the real itself, that visual evidence may be too persuasive, too
compelling.
And yet, as we shall see next, many judges during the 1930s and 1940s
were more easily seduced by the moving image than their predecessors
were by the photograph. Perhaps this suggests that the courtroom and the
cinema may share more in common than we might think.
129. See Nancy West & Penelope Pelizzon, Smile, My Lovely: Photography, Film Noir, and
Identity (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
130. In this sense, Northside follows classical film narrative's tendency to make the individual
into a heroic figure. Like the Western hero or the private detective, McNeal is portrayed as emerging
triumphant over rigid social forces by following his own instincts and codes of conduct. For further
discussion of this point, see Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 284-85.
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III. FILM AS LEGAL EVIDENCE
So far, this Article has striven to show how Northside is a film that
centers upon questions of evidence. On the one hand, the film itself is a
study in evidence. It interrogates three distinct modes of proof, critiques
legal conceptions of evidence, and concludes by offering up the
photograph as the evidentiary ideal, a seemingly "pure" form of
knowledge that retains its power even when it is enlarged, sent over a
wire, and reconstituted somewhere else. On the other hand, as a
reenactment, Northside sets itself up as evidence, or, at a minimum, as a
true retelling of an actual case. That is, recognizing Northside's status as a
reenactment invites precisely the same questions Northside asks about
proof, but this time at a meta-level. What makes a filmic depiction
credible? What makes the viewers of Northside know that even if
Northside isn't "real," it indeed portrays "real" events in a manner that can
be trusted? Do not be misled-while the film is simultaneously fact and
fiction (just as the photograph in the film is both the critical fact and itself
a fiction), Northside is not, in fact, particularly reflexive. Rather than
interrogating its own authority or generating skepticism about the
possibilities for knowledge, the film simply wants viewers to believe in its
authority.'31 In short, the film is about two spheres of evidence, the lay and
the legal. The film portrays the limits of legal evidence-the willingness
to be satisfied by unreliable eyewitness testimony, the unwillingness to see
the evidence of machines of judgment. It shows both the unrivalled
persuasive power of visual proof and reveals that finding the proof that
will satisfy the law can be a serendipitous enterprise. At the same time,
while the film is neither documentary nor fiction, it is itself a form of
proof. It is designed to be a persuasive rendition of a true story of justice
nearly denied, revealing indisputably both Frank Wiecek's innocence and
the precariousness of justice. Reenactments, we might say, offer a kind of
lay evidence. As one of the advertisements for the film on Northside's
press sheet put it hyperbolically, "Every word is true."' 32
And so, in this final section of the Article, we will turn to look at the
third side of this triangle of evidence: films as legal evidence. We shall see
that there are, in fact, interesting parallels between Northside's claims
about visual proof and the reception of films in actual courtrooms. Just as
Northside's credibility, both at the plot level and as the reenactment of a
true story, depends on retaining a certain nafvet6 about the meaning of the
visual image, judges who confronted filmic evidence elided the
complexities of the form. Moreover, the conflation between the
131. Our reading of the film, in this sense, departs substantially from that of Telotte, who sees
Northside, as well as other noir documentaries, as possessing a great deal of self-reflexivity. See
TELOTTE, supra note 16, at 141.
132. Exhibitor's Campaign Sheet, supra note 50.
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photograph and the film, implicit in Northside, becomes explicit when
films become a form of legal proof. Finally, on those few occasions when
filmed reenactments were used in trials, they were often seen to be as
powerful as the real thing. Actually, these filmed reenactments were even
more successful at operating simultaneously as fiction and as fact than
Northside, not only standing in for the actual event but offering a form of
proof that was seen to be, in fact, superior to it.
Films were offered into evidence in court as early as 1913-merely
seventeen years after the first motion pictures were displayed to audiences.
For the next twenty years, juries in a number of states viewed the
occasional film in evidence, but few appellate courts ruled on their
admissibility. Though films appear to have been used without objection on
occasion in trials, the only two reported appellate cases before the end of
the 1920s that analyzed their use both supported their exclusion.
The earliest appellate case to examine the admissibility of a film was
Gibson v. Gunn, decided in 1923.133 The plaintiff was suing to recover for
damages resulting from having been struck by the defendant's automobile.
The plaintiff was a vaudeville dancer who, at some point prior to the
current accident, had lost his leg and had been forced to use a prosthesis
but was nonetheless able to continue in vaudeville with his artificial leg.
He displayed to the jury a motion picture that he used as the opening
entertainment in his vaudeville show; the film portrayed the plaintiff on
crutches, walking into a shop that sold artificial limbs, and leaving the
store walking under his own power. In the following scene, he
encountered two friends, dancers who performed certain tricks-the
plaintiff performed these same tricks as well as other stunts that his able-
bodied buddies viewed as too difficult for them. 134 Though the opinion
does not detail the plaintiffs motivation for displaying the picture,
presumably he wanted the jury to see how competent and sure in
movement he was despite his artificial leg, in order to rebut either an
explicit or implicit claim that his new injuries did not cause him much
additional damage or loss in income considering his prior one-legged
condition.
Whatever his justification for showing the film, the appellate court was
not impressed. The opinion deems the admission of the film "a radical
departure from the rules of evidence," notes that "moving pictures present
a fertile field for exaggeration of any emotion or action," and complains
that no evidence was presented "as to how this particular motion film was
prepared." '35 Worse, the film "brought before the jury irrelevant matter,
hearsay and incompetent evidence, and tended to make a farce of the
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trial." It is as if the performer had performed on the wrong stage: "The
plaintiffs ability as a vaudeville performer was not the issue, and his
eccentric dancing, comic songs and the dialogue and remarks of his
fellow-performers had no place in the trial in the Supreme Court of the
state."'36 While some of their specific criticisms of the film are not without
merit (one might, for example, be legitimately concerned about the lack of
proof of how the film was made and about the fact that the statements
made by the vaudevillian's buddies within the film may have been
hearsay), the judges' discomfort does not seem to stem from these
particular concerns, but rather from something deeper and less inchoate.
Showing a film at a trial? A vulgar entertainment in the arena of judgment,
vaudeville theater invading the theater of proof? It is more than the judges
can bear. They say so themselves: The film threatened to make the trial
itself into a farce.
The next appellate discussion of an attempted use of film also came
down in favor of exclusion. This case, decided in 1926, involved alleged
stock fraud. 37 One of the issues in the case was whether glass caskets
could feasibly be manufactured; the defendant sought to introduce a film
that purported to show the actual manufacture of these caskets at the
defendant's Oklahoma plant. The trial court refused to allow the
defendants to show the film, declaring, "A motion picture does not of
itself prove an actual occurrence. The thing reproduced must be
established by the testimony of witnesses."'3 The court said that
determining whether the film was sufficiently verified to warrant its
admission was up to the trial court. But the opinion then offered a circular
argument, one that, if taken at face value, would mean that the exclusion
of a motion picture as evidence could never constitute error: "[I]f, as
contended by counsel for appellant, the testimony relative to the process
of manufacture completely verifies the picture, then he cannot
successfully claim injury from the refusal of the court to repeat this
testimony by a moving picture display of the facts already in evidence." '139
Essentially, the court suggests, quite reasonably, that a film has to be
verified by testimony to be admissible. But if testimony verifies the film in
every particular, then the exclusion of the film cannot harm the party, for
it is by definition cumulative-what the film shows is already in evidence,
through the testimony necessary to verify the film in the first place. A film
is thus either insufficiently verified or inherently cumulative.
Unfortunately, the opinion in the case provides little detail on the facts
underlying the criminal charges. One imagines, however, that the trial
judge may have been concerned that the perpetrators of an elaborate stock
136. Id.
137. De Camp v. United States, 10 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
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fraud might well have also "manufactured" a film showing the company's
manufacturing plant. The film might have been authenticated, in the sense
that a witness vouched for its accuracy, and yet nonetheless be nothing
more than fiction. The circular approach taken by the appellate court thus
provides a tool for upholding the exclusion of a film of dubious reliability
by giving the trial judge unlimited discretion. The appellate court does not
merely think the trial court had the discretion to exclude the film; it views
the trial court as having been right to exclude the film: "[T]he admission
of the motion picture would have amounted to nothing more than a
spectacular display of a situation based upon facts in evidence.""14 The
tone of this opinion is far less outraged than that of Gibson v. Gunn, but
we still see hints of the same concern: A film may be a "spectacular
display" that debases legal process and turns the courtroom itself into a
spectacle.
Films as spectacles: This observation demands pause for reflection.
Spectacle is part of a long tradition of popular forms, such as the circus or
magical acts of traveling fairs dating back centuries. 141 Spectacles are
sensational; they are designed to provoke sensation, to appeal to the
viewer's emotions. It is this sensational response that the judges are leery
of, and while their reaction may be unduly alarmist, it reflects a serious
concern: that films may be so powerful, so persuasive, that they will carry
along the viewers toward a conclusion that would not be warranted by
reason. In fact, we can tease out three separate anxieties: first, that films as
evidence may cheapen the trial, demeaning its seriousness by importing a
form of popular entertainment, delegitimating verdicts by association with
vaudeville. Second, that evidentiary films may encourage juries to make
determinations based on emotion rather than reason. (Jurors may be lured
by sensation and fail properly to sift the evidence.) Third, that films
carried the risk of seeming too real, eliminating the distance between a
representation and the actual event. Leading evidence scholar John Henry
Wignore cautioned judges about this risk in the 1923 edition of his
treatise on evidence: "Theoretically, of course, the motion picture can
never be assumed to represent the actual occurrence .... And yet, any
motion picture is apt to cause forgetfulness of this and to impress the jury
with the convincing impartiality of Nature herself."
1 42
The opinions of these early judges, however, do not represent the
approach that came to typify judicial response to motion picture evidence.
For the most part, those judges who were faced with this new
140. Id.
141. Much has been written on the cultural history and operation of "spectacles." See, e.g.,
JONATHAN CRARY, TECHNIQUES OF THE OBSERVER (1993); Jean-Luc Comolli, Machines of the
Visible, in THE CINEMATIC APPARATUS 121 (Stephen Heath & Teresa de Lauretis eds., 1980); and
Elizabeth Cowie, The Spectacle ofActuality, in COLLECTING VISIBLE EVIDENCE, supra note 66, at 19.
142. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 98, § 798.
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technological form of proof resisted the notion that films as evidence
raised any complicated evidentiary or interpretive questions. The typical
response was simply to analogize the film to a collection of photographs,
and to argue that, since photographs were admissible so long as a proper
foundation was established, then films should be as well. There was, to be
sure, still occasional continued discomfort with the "spectacular" nature of
film, as well as soft murmurs of concern over whether film might be too
lifelike a medium, too vivid and too convincing. But these moments of
anxiety were the exception. Most of the time, judges saw movies as
nothing more than a series of still photographs, a sequence of individual
frames made into one seamless whole, and they saw the whole as no more
and no less than its constituent parts.
The basic logic is well illustrated, for example, by a 1937 California
case, Heiman v. Market: "[I]t is established beyond question that
photographs may be admitted in evidence, that moving pictures are but a
series of single pictures, and that as single pictures may be received in
evidence, there is no reason why moving pictures may not be admitted."' 43
The description of film as a "series of photographs" is obviously intended
to make filmic evidence unproblematic, for by the 1920s, photographs had
been regularly used as legal evidence for more than forty years. More
importantly, this rough equation of film with photography serves to
minimize film's "spectacular" quality-taming film, as it were, into
possessing one of the most desirable characteristics for the courtroom:
immobility. It suggests that the viewers of cinematic evidence possess
more control over what they watch than they actually do, since
photographs, because they depict one frozen moment in time, allow for
careful and repetitive inspection far more easily than films do. And, by
linking film with photography, the description also capitalizes on the
latter's historical associations with accuracy and objectivity, a point to
which we will return shortly.
Unlike the two early judges who were repelled by films as evidence,
then, most of the judges who considered them were quite taken with the
extraordinary probative value of the proof they offered. And though
Wigmore's warning that the representation might be mistaken for the real
was frequently cited, it was generally not viewed as a reason to exclude
the film from evidence. What accounts for the surprising lack of anxiety
about filmic evidence? Why did the early concerns-that films were
frivolous, spectacular, and too persuasive-come to seem less pressing?
We shall return to this question at the conclusion of this Section, but we
can begin to offer one answer here: Judges may have been influenced by
the particular nature of the films that were used in the courtroom. Most of
the motion pictures that made their way into evidence in the 1930s and
143. Heiman v. Market, 69 P.2d 178 (Cal. App. 1937).
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1940s fell into two broad categories. The vast majority were films taken
surreptitiously by insurance companies (or other defendants), exposing the
plaintiff as a malingerer who was overstating or downright faking
injuries. 44 Or, on occasion, they were reenactments or recreations of
matters at issue in the trial, including, in a few instances, filmed
reenactments of the crime itself. For reasons that we shall explore, both of
these sorts of films seemed especially "safe" to use as legal evidence,
seemingly exempt from the concerns that led a few early judges to voice
serious concern about the use of filmic evidence.
Judges generally allowed defendants to present motion picture evidence
that revealed that a plaintiffs injuries were less severe than the plaintiff
claimed. 145 Indeed, some appellate courts found that if such a film had
been properly authenticated, its exclusion constituted reversible error. In
Boyarsky v. Zimmerman, a plumber working on a building was hit on the
head by a bolt that crashed down from fifty-five feet above, where
steelworkers, employed by a different subcontractor, were also at work.
Eight months after the accident, the defendant secretly filmed the plaintiff
walking along the street carrying a parcel, in order to show that the
"plaintiff's claim that he was physically incapable of working was
untrue."'146 The court writes,
In view of the claim of the plaintiff that he was totally disabled and
unable to work or earn a living at any useful employment this case is
a striking illustration of an instance where moving pictures are not
only admissible but very important.... In the present case the
defendant, appellant, properly points out that the pictures taken of the
plaintiff, who contends that he received very severe injuries, will
show that he went to live in another city and there evidently
conducted himself as a perfectly well man instead of the invalid
144. This courtroom use of surveillance film constitutes the logical outcome of nearly fifty years
of using photography and film to make private and furtive acts public. As the work of film scholar
Tom Gunning has shown, a series of interlocking inventions-beginning with the invention of the
"detective camera" in the early 1880s-came to popularize the use of surreptitious picture-taking as
entertainment. Indeed, as Gunning points out, cinema was "bom out" of this form of entertainment,
since actuality-films, rather than fictional films, constituted the main product of the cinema for over
ten years. Within this climate, Gunning writes,
The apparatus of the cinema allows the passage from private to public space, and its role as
simultaneously witness and record endows it with a juridical effect, providing both evidence of
wrongdoing and the occasion for judgment and punishment. The viewer of the film negotiates
this propulsion of private deeds into public exposure, positioned as both voyeur-witness and
moral judge through the surrogate apparatus.
Tom Gunning, Embarrassing Evidence: The Detective Camera and the Documentary Impulse, in
COLLECTING VISIBLE EVIDENCE, supra note 66, at 46, 46 (1999).
145. See also Kortz v. Guardian Life Ins. of Amer., 144 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1944); Bethlehem
Steel v. Foy, 108 P.2d 698 (Cal. App. 1940); Heiman v. Market, 21 Cal. App. 2d 311 (1937);
Wallendorf v. N.Y. Life Ins., 12 S.2d 585 (Fl. 1943); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. McDonald, 134
S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1939); Denison v. Omaha 7 C.B. St. R. Co., 280 N.W. 905 (Neb. 1938); Mason v.
Evans, 69 A.2d 33 (N.J. Sup. 1949).
146. Boyarsky v. Zimmerman, 270 N.Y.S. 134 (1934).
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which he claimed to be.' 47
On occasion, judges allowed these secret movies even when the
defendant "entrapped" the plaintiff into conducting the activities that were
filmed. First, it is worth quoting at length the detailed description of the
film in one of these cases, to see just how damning these motion pictures
could be:
The first picture shows the plaintiff at a golf course, what is
commonly called a driving range. He and his lady friend are using a
bucket of balls and the plaintiff especially, is driving the balls out
into the field. The plaintiff stoops over to take a ball out of the bucket
or basket, places it on a tee and strikes the ball with splendid form
and carry through. The plaintiff is next seen tossing a basketball.
Next he is seen throwing baseballs at a doll rack, or some similar
device. Next he is rowing a boat. He is next seen at the lake front
preparatory to going swimming. He had his swimming trunks on
under his clothes, and the camera discloses that he undressed at the
beach, but was not wearing his leather jacket. He and his blonde lady
friend go in swimming, and he is shown teaching her how to swim,
and lifting her almost out of the water, and as the picture ends it is as
though he were rescuing her from drowning, with his left arm under
her chin and supporting her and swimming around with his right
arm. 1
48
So much for the plaintiff's claims of incapacity.
The plaintiff, however, claimed that he had only engaged in these
activities because the woman who also appeared in the film had urged him
to, and that (unbeknownst to him at the time of their frolicking) she was
actually an agent of the defendant. The court was not impressed: "We do
not think it is material what part this girl took in persuading the plaintiff to
do what the pictures disclose he did do. The pictures speak for themselves
and show that the defendant could do things that he claimed at the trial he
could not do."'149 The pictures speak for themselves: They impeach the
plaintiff, showing his testimony to be composed of lies, just as the
photograph in Northside seems to show that Wanda Skutnik lied upon the
stand.
These movies, taken secretly and then made public before the jury, are
particularly interesting because they reveal the theatrical aspects of all
legal proof. They show up plaintiffs as actors: When they appear in court,
looking ragged or stooped, injured and miserable, they may simply be
putting on a show for the jury. Is the seemingly injured plaintiff a genuine
147. Id.
148. McGoorty v. Benhart, 27 N.E.2d 289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940).
149. Id. Courts did occasionally evince some concern that defendants could "entrap" plaintiffs
into appearing on film, but the courts usually admitted the film evidence nonetheless. See, e.g.,
Maryland Cas. v. Coker, 118 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1941).
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victim, or merely a malingerer? Can the jury be trusted to tell exactly
which plaintiffs are acting, to separate fact from fiction? The films taken
by detective agencies and other commercial filmmakers let the jury spy on
plaintiffs when they are unsuspecting, going about the daily business of
life. There is a certain irony in using film-the medium of actors-to
reveal what these plaintiffs are like when they are not posing for a jury.150
These films did not seem to be spectacles themselves: In fact, the
subjects of the film did not even know that their actions were being caught
on film, and clearly there was no risk that they were playing to the camera
or unconsciously influenced by the presence of the recording instrument.
Rather than appearing as spectacles themselves, these films revealed the
spectacular aspect of the plaintiffs in-court behavior. They showed that
the plaintiff was playing to the jury's sympathies, preying on emotion and
sensation. These films seemed to bring reality into the courtroom; to
exclude them would have meant allowing the plaintiff to stage a dramatic
performance unchecked and unconstrained by the contradictory evidence
of his or her actual out-of-court behavior. Given this choice between
allowing the film into evidence and allowing the plaintiff to dramatize
with impunity, it is not surprising that judges almost always saw these
films as legitimate evidence.
Reenactments were not nearly so common as these spy films; in fact,
there are only a handful of appellate decisions discussing their use in the
1940s. But occasionally, defendants would, astounding though it may
seem, agree to reenact their own crimes for the police and before the
camera. In one such case, there had been a fatal shooting at DiCioda's
liquor store in Los Angeles in 1947. The defendants allegedly committed
another robbery a few hours later, and then, when the police stopped them
to ask some questions a few weeks later, they shot and wounded one of the
officers. Six weeks afterward, they were arrested, and implicated
themselves in the liquor store homicide. They also agreed to reenact their
crime and have this reenactment recorded on film. At trial, the defendants
repudiated their confessions, and claimed that they had made them under
coercion. 5' The three motion pictures--each one showing a reenactment
of one of the alleged crimes, the homicide, the robbery, and the shooting
of the police-were shown at trial. Testimony was introduced to show
how the films were set up and made:
150. These courtroom films are a version of cinema v~ritd; like vdritd they endeavor "to render
the film-making itself invisible and to give viewers the sense of unmediated access to the
contingencies of an actuality uncompromised by the camera." CORNER, supra note 67, at 44. One of
the key qualities of v~ritd, it has been argued, is "a firm commitment to the 'evidentiality' of film." Id.
Comer further argues that the reenactment (or, in his terms, the drama-documentary) and v~rit6
together "put pressure on documentary 'look' and 'truth' by developing specific generic characteristics
and aspirations to an extreme degree," though obviously in quite different ways. Id. at 55. It is
interesting to recognize that the two forms of films used as legal evidence are precisely those kinds of
films that both partake in and problematize documentary's naive claims to truthful depiction.
151. People v. Dabb, 197 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
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There was first a rehearsal of each incident, at which the defendants
were asked to show what they had done. From this it was determined
where the camera should be set up in order to embrace all of the
action, and the entire scene was then photographed, with the sound
and pictures being simultaneously recorded on the same strip of
film. 15
2
The court noted that motion pictures are susceptible to fabrication, but
thought that the way to handle this risk was by requiring adequate
foundation evidence to establish that the film was properly taken,
developed, and not tampered with, as a prerequisite to admissibility. The
court further recognized that films might be misleading, or unduly vivid,
but emphasized that a voluntary reenactment was unlikely to suffer from
these dangers:
A motion picture of the artificial recreation of an event may unduly
accentuate certain phases of the happening, and because of the
forceful impression made upon the minds of the jurors by this kind of
evidence, it should be received with caution.... However, when the
events which are being photographed consist of a voluntary
reenactment by the accused of what occurred, there is little, if any,
danger of misleading emphasis which is unfavorable to him.
Moreover, as a method of presenting confessions, sound motion
pictures appear to have a unique advantage in that, while presenting
the admission of guilt, they simultaneously testify to facts relevant to
the issue of volition.
53
It is worth dwelling for a moment on the strangeness of these
reenactment films. Why, one wonders, would a criminal suspect agree to
let the police make a movie of his crime? Is he or she lured by the desire
to play a starring role in a two-bit drama? Is it the same dynamic that
drives criminal suspects to confess: an urge to tell their stories, an urge for
someone to know what has happened? 5 4 In some of these films, the
criminal suspects and the police return together to the actual scene of the
crime, and sometimes a cop plays the victim, the police and the
perpetrators performing together in a spectacle of proof.55
What exactly are these reenactments? They are, in fact, spectacles of
proof. They are extremely persuasive evidence that the defendant
committed the crime because they simultaneously show and tell: They
literally show the defendant committing the crime, and they also show, by
the fact of their existence, that the defendant was willing to tell everyone
that she or he committed the crime. They are not just proof, but also
152. Id. at 7-8.
153. Id. at9.
154. For an analysis of the role of the confession in law and literature, see PETER BROOKS,
TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERATuRE (2000).
155. See, e.g., People v. Rowe, 99 Cal. App. 3d 1023 (1975).
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spectacle: a compelling display before the jury of the police and the
criminals together engaged in a form of cinema v~ritd. As reenactments,
these films show the jury what it was like when the defendant committed
the crime. His actions are replayed before the jury's eyes, turning the
jurors into virtual witnesses'5 6 to the events underlying the trial. Of course,
these reenactments do not "actually" reveal what the crime looked like;
they are post-hoc representations, not filmed depictions of the event itself.
In fact, though, they may offer even more persuasive evidence than a film
that actually caught the criminal in the act. Films that capture the actual
moment on camera might indeed be powerful evidence-but they are
subject to reinterpretation, or to reinscription within a larger narrative, or
to analysis that makes what looks clear on film seem more complicated or
muddy once it is explained or contextualized. 157 By contrast, when a
suspect agrees to participate in a reenactment of his own crime, it is a form
of confession, but a confession by demonstration rather than simply by
words. Of course, such a film could itself be placed within a larger context
(as those defendants who claimed coercion were attempting to do), but it
is hard to make such a context stick, for the films themselves demonstrate
the defendants' guilt."'
Courts continued, on occasion, to register discomfort about the
"spectacular" nature of filmic evidence. In a case where the appellate
court insisted that a film be excluded because it was misleading, the judge
writes dryly, "Doubtless the show was highly entertaining to the jury, but
entertainment of the jury is no function of a trial. And why all this fuss to
prove a fact susceptible of easy, exact, and indisputable demonstration by
actual measurement?" ' But for the most part, courts seemed complacent
about cinematic evidence, confident that films, becoming ever more
popular as a medium of news and entertainment, could offer reliable
evidence in court as well. They were appreciative of the evidence that
156. The term "virtual witness" is borrowed from STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON SCHAFFER,
LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR PUMP (1985).
157. The acquittal of the officers in the state criminal case resulting from the beating of Rodney
King is an obvious example of how a videotape that seems upon first viewing to show something
clearly-in this instance the use of excessive force by the police--can be read differently when it is
explained frame-by-frame. See, e.g., Kimberld Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, in
READING RODNEY KING/READING URBAN UPRISING 56 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993); Chuck
Hagen, Photography View: The Power of a Video Image Depends on the Caption, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 1992, §2, at 32; How the Defense Dissected the Tape, NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1992, at 36.
158. Reenacted depictions of the crime, like any other form of confession, might of course be
false. On the phenomenon of the false confession, see Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession
Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221 (1997); Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Keichel, The Social
Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, Internalization and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI.
125 (1996); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision To Confess Falsely: Rational Choice
and Irrational Action, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 979 (1997); and Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The
Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory 'and Classification of True and False
Confessions, 16 STUD. L. & SOC'Y, 189 (1997).
159. Hadrian v. Milwaukee, 1 N.W.2d 755 (Wisc. 1942).
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films could offer-seemingly direct access to critical matters ranging from
the way the crime was actually committed to the plaintiffs actual physical
condition-and were strikingly unconcerned about distortion, either the
distortions that might be present within the filmic representation, or
distortions of the trial process that might result from the growing use of
such "spectacular" evidence. Of course, trials can be spectacles
themselves, and the presentation of evidence is a show that one side puts
on before the factfinder; in this sense, filmic evidence within a trial is like
a play-within-a-play. But filmic evidence walks a very fine line between
fact and fiction, between reconstruction and representation. Like the
filmed reenactment of Northside, a film made in order to be legal evidence
is simultaneously real and unreal, documentary and drama.
We will return now, at more length, to the central puzzle raised by this
brief look at the use of actual films as legal evidence: Why did judges
overcome their early concerns about this spectacular form of proof and
decide that films were a legitimate form of proof? It is tempting, fifty
years later, to position these judges as na'fve-too easily awed by visual
technology to see through it. If such a reading is fair, a certain irony
emerges, given that photography, in its early days, received a substantially
more critical evaluation from judges. Why, in other words, would late-
nineteenth-century judges express such informed skepticism about
photographic authority, while their counterparts some decades later were
relatively sanguine about filmic evidence?
We will offer four arguments, all of them admittedly speculative, for
why judges latched onto filmic evidence relatively uncritically. First,
judges may have been influenced by the contemporaneous emergence of a
form of film that claimed to offer truthful representation: the documentary.
In fact, shortly before judges were starting to embrace film as possessing
the authority of a "series of photographs," the documentary movement had
begun its development in Britain and the United States.16 ° From its very
beginnings, the rhetoric surrounding the documentary film focused on
such key concepts and nouns as "knowledge," "information," "sobriety,"
"objectivity." The intention, of course, was to associate documentary film
with the serious, to position it-along with law, science, and other
information-oriented fields-as what Bill Nichols calls a "discourse of
sobriety." '161 In so doing, documentary filmmakers even referred to their
individual films as "possessing all the authority and close attention of the
photograph.... [O]ur aim is not to offer light entertainment but to show
the raw truth, exposed and frozen forever as image, just as Jacob Riis and
160. The date of "origin" for the documentary movement is generally accepted as 1926, the year
in which the leading figure of the movement in Britain and America, John Grierson, coined the term.
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others have done with their photographs. 162 This echo of the very
description deployed by judges to legitimate films as evidence (film as a
"series of photographs")-an echo that we can hear in other descriptions
of documentary film as well-alerts us to the possibility that the
documentary movement may, in fact, have helped shape legal notions
about the evidential usefulness of cinema. Between the late 1920s and
early 1940s, the documentary film enjoyed a powerful reputation in
American culture as objective, earnest, and trustworthy-characteristics
which proponents of the movement reinforced by setting the sobriety of
the documentary against the "spectacle" of mainstream Hollywood
cinema.161
Yet, as film scholar Elizabeth Cowie describes, even documentary
films, simply because they are films, possess elements of the spectacle.
"For all its seriousness, the documentary film nevertheless also involves
more disreputable features of cinema usually associated with the
entertainment film, namely, the pleasures and fascination of film as
spectacle."' These pleasures arise not through make-believe or fictional
enactment but by the representation of actuality. Thus, inherent in the
viewing of any film, no matter what its purpose, audience, method, or
genre, are two desires: a desire for reality captured, securely contained for
dissection and analysis, and a desire for the real not as knowledge but as
image, as spectacle. In the early days of the documentary movement,
however, such a recognition was rarely articulated; what was articulated,
over and over again, and often by analogy to photography, was the
documentary's seriousness of purpose. And, while the judges of the two
early appellate cases anticipated Cowie's observations by warning the
legal community of film's "spectacular" nature, later judges-those
writing some time after the development of documentary film in
America-seemed willing enough to see film as a "discourse of sobriety."
Whether or not judges were in fact influenced by the rise of documentary
filmmaking, surely documentary filmmakers could not have asked for a
more powerful alliance.
The second argument for why judges came to accept filmic evidence
with relative ease is quite straightforward: By analogizing films to
photographs, judges made the film into a comprehensible-and
162. Id. at 7; see also ERIK BARNOUW, DOCUMENTARY: A HISTORY OF THE NON-FICTION FILM
254-55 (1974) (discussing these analogies to photography).
163. As Bill Nichols observes, "A deep-rooted response in documentary filmimaking has been
vigorous disassociation from the distracting shadow-play of fiction. Early documentarists were
particularly vehement in their judgments of the fiction film." NICHOLS, supra note 160, at 4. Among
these filmmakers were Dziga Vertov and John Grierson, who "drew harsh and unflattering
comparisons between the fiction film industry and both the formal potential of cinema and the social
purpose of the documentary. They lambasted Hollywood as a symbol for escapist, meretricious
spectacles." Id.
164. Cowie, supra note 141, at 19.
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admissible-form of evidence. If photographs were admissible (and they
long had been so) and films were nothing more than a series of
photographs, then films did not pose tricky problems of categorization or
analysis. This process of analogizing the new to the known is, of course, a
mainstay of legal reasoning as well as a commonplace judicial reaction to
new technological forms.'65 In fact, when confronted with the photograph
decades earlier, judges made a similar conceptual move: They analogized
the photograph to maps, models, and diagrams, thus making the new into
the familiar.166
Analogical reasoning, however, involves emphasizing similarity and
eliding difference. If x can be analogized toy, it means that the two items
are the same in all the ways that count; the battleground, of course,
becomes determining which, exactly, are the ways that count. When
judges analogized photographs to drawings, the analogy foregrounded the
ways in which the photograph was a constructed representation, a human
creation rather than a mirror of nature. It was, in significant part, this
analogy that led judges to resist any simplistic notion of the photograph as
an unmediated depiction of the real.' 67 Over time, as photographic
admissibility became taken for granted, the power of the analogy faded,
and judges began to see the photograph both as an illustration and, at
times, as a silent witness.'68 Still, the key point is that the analogy
circumscribed the way that the photograph was understood. The analogy
between films and photographs may have had a similar circumscribing
effect. It provided judges with a way to ignore some of the differences
between photography and film: that films captured movement and the
passage of time instead of a single instant; that films were typically edited
into their final form; that the process of "reading" a film was less familiar
to a lay juror than "reading" a photograph. But even this list is misleading,
165. For the classic account of case-by-case reasoning in the law, see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING (1949). For how analogy operates in legal discourse, see, for
example, Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of
Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1996); Cass Sunstein, On Analogical
Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
166. Mnookin, supra note 122, at 24-27, 45-50, 54-55.
167. In this sense, legal discourse was vastly different from other nineteenth-century discourses,
which tended to exaggerate the novelty of photography as a medium. As photo historian John Tagg
notes, "What is striking in the earliest articulated responses to the invention and dissemination of
photography is how often the images it began to pour forth are hailed (or alternatively denounced) as a
totally new currency, not only quantitatively but qualitatively different from any previous kind of
image production." JOHN TAGG, GROUNDS OF DISPUTE: ART HISTORY, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND THE
DISCURSIVE FIELD 122 (1992).
168. See, e.g., People v. Bowley, 382 P.2d 591, 594 (Cal. 1963) (declaring that photographs can
be "silent witnesses" that provide substantive evidence and not merely illustrate someone's
testimony); Sisk v. State, 204 A.2d 684, 685 (Ct. App. Md. 1964); John H. Anderson, Jr., Admissibility
of Photographs as Evidence, 7 N.C. L. REV. 443 (1929) (suggesting that a case excluding a
photograph as substantive evidence was incorrectly decided); Dillard S. Gardner, The Camera Goes to
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for the power of the analogy was to make analysis of the similarities and
differences between films and photographs optional. Judges could, and
often did, simply make the analogy and then admit the film, as if it were
syllogistic logic in action: Photographs, when verified by an attesting
witness, are admissible; films are a series of photographs; therefore, films,
when verified by an attesting witness, are admissible.
The third argument for why judges became comfortable with filmic
evidence focuses on the particularly persuasive power of the types of
films-surveillance films and reenactments-that were used in the
courtroom. We have already discussed this point, so we shall simply recap
briefly here. Surveillance films carried the weight of exposure;
reenactments, when performed by the actual criminals, carried the weight
of confession. To have excluded surveillance films would have been to
allow the plaintiff to lie with impunity. These films, instead of seeming
fictional or spectacular themselves, seemed to reign in otherwise
dangerous, in-court performances of injury.
Further support for the argument that judges admitted filmic evidence
because of the particularly persuasive nature of the films involved can be
gleaned by recalling those films that were excluded from evidence, such
as a manufacturing process that might never have existed, and a
vaudevillian's opening act. When the films themselves seemed to be either
fictional creations or performances, judges barred them.1 69 When the use
of fiction in court became too obvious, judges resisted because one of the
fictions of law is that trials are places for the determination of facts, not
(or at least not merely) the construction of stories. 7 ° So long as films
promised to counteract other fictions-the fiction of the injured plaintiff,
the fiction of the innocent defendant-they were a legitimate and desirable
form of evidence, for they could provide tales of truth rather than
encouraging flights of fancy.
Finally, there is a fourth, related reason why judges may have found
filmic evidence difficult to resist. This has to do with the conception of
what kind of evidence courts prefer, and the implicit epistemology of legal
evidence. Our system of rules governing the admissibility of evidence
rests upon a set of basic assumptions, and fundamental among them is that
we prefer that proof which comes closest to direct sensory perception. We
have built a regime of legal evidence that is deeply Lockean, that assumes
169. This is not to say that the law and fiction operate in different realms; in fact, as Sherwin
claims in the opening of his recent book on popular culture and law, "The law is shot through with
fiction." SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES Pop, supra note 19, at 3.
170. There is in fact a large recent literature analyzing the trial as a process of narrative
construction. See, e.g., BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 61; Pennington & Hastie, supra note 61.
Even the Supreme Court has given a nod to the critical role that the making of narratives plays in the
trial process. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (arguing that "a syllogism is not a
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that knowledge must derive from the experiences of the senses.17' Hence,
as a general rule, witnesses can testify only to things about which they
have personal knowledge. And even if they have personal knowledge they
must testify only to their perceptions-they are to report what they saw or
heard directly, without gloss or interpretation. 17 2 As Robert Bums
describes it in his recent book on the trial as a cultural form, our legal
system requires, as "more a first principle than a rule of evidence," that the
jury hear "an artificially stripped-down, value-free account of the
witness's perceptions."'' 73 Why this emphasis on direct perception?
According to Bums, the typical explanation ("the received view") is that it
contributes to the functioning of the rule of law, by giving the jury the
basic building blocks for their decision in a form that makes it less likely
that the jury will simply adopt the value judgments or conclusions of the
witnesses.'74
This explanation is clearly part of the story. But equally important is
that what we are striving for, our ideal form of evidence, is that which will
somehow give the jury direct access to the past: genuine knowledge,
whatever that is, of what actually occurred. In this sense, the trial and the
reenactment share an important similarity. Both aim to produce
knowledge of a past event, knowledge that counts as true despite the
inability of both trials and reenactments to capture the past directly. (We
shall return to this similarity shortly.) And implicit in the rules of evidence
is the belief that this knowledge is most likely to emerge from that
evidence which is closest to the event itself-a direct eyewitness rather
than a second-hand account, or an immediate description of what
happened rather than a later one made after the witness had time for
reflection. Legal scholar Kim Scheppele has invoked a wonderful
metaphor for precisely this point: We strive to reach ground-zero, the
physical and temporal location of the events that gave rise to the litigation.
In her words,
The point of American evidence law is to enable the reproduction of
the ground-zero moment and its aftermath to assess what truly
happened. . . . [G]round zero is the moment when "the trouble"
occurred and the law of evidence strives to admit facts that were
generated as close in time and space as possible to the moment when
this trouble happened. 1
75
Since the jury can't see the ground-zero moment for itself, we want the
171. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H. Nidditch ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (1690).
172. These conceptions are embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, but they come from
common-law conceptions of admissibility. See FED. R. EvID. 602, 701.
173. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 20-21 (2000).
174. Id.at2l.
175. Kim Scheppele, The Ground Zero Theory of Evidence, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 321, 322 (1998).
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jury to see and hear the next best thing: the direct sensory report of
percipient witnesses, those who were in fact at ground-zero.
We have detailed so far two basic epistemological assumptions built
into our rules of evidence: first, a preference for direct perception, and
second, a preference for direct perception of the underlying events
themselves, the ground-zero moment. But there is a third assumption as
well, not quite so explicit in the evidence rules but equally real. And that
is, quite simply, that among various forms of sense perception, seeing is
best: that visual perception is both most authoritative and most
persuasive. 176 This preference is implicit, not explicit. No rule avows the
primacy of the visual. Nevertheless, we can recognize it in a variety of
ways: in the far greater attention paid to issues of eyewitnessing than
earwitnessing; in the assumption that juries can judge credibility in part
because they see the witness's demeanor; in the dominance of visual
metaphors; and, perhaps especially, in the widespread use of visual
evidence."77 One advocacy manual describes our fixation with evidence
that can be seen as
"the wax museum" effect. People are fascinated by the real thing.
The bullets that were found lodged in the victim's heart, the actual
handwritten memorandum that was used to seal the agreement, the
remains of the automobile gas tank that ruptured on impact burning
the occupants of the car .... Until we see something tangible, [the
event] is something that did not happen, or at least did not happen to
real people.'78
It isn't real until we see it. This, at last, brings us back to films as
evidence. Films offer an especially powerful medium for making
experience seem real: to watch a film of an event or occurrence provides
the almost-illusion of having been there ourselves. In contemporary
courtrooms, there are, on occasion, films that actually do capture ground
zero: videos taken at the scene itself, capturing the moment in question for
posterity and for courtroom scrutiny. 179 Although there were not such
films in the 1940s courtroom, the surveillance films do offer a kind of
access to ground zero. They do not show the scene of the plaintiffs injury,
176. Whether this is a legal preference or simply the byproduct of a more general cultural belief
in the primacy of the visual is not important for our purposes. On the traditionally central role of
visuality in law and culture, see Bernard Hibbits, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and
the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARD. L. REV. 229 (1994) (arguing that vision
has been central to law, but that aurality is now growing more important). On the hegemony of vision
in modernity (and the existence of an anti-visual discourse), the classic work is MARTIN JAY,
DOWNCAST EYES: THE DENIGRATION OF VISION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY FRENCH THOUGHT (1993).
177. See generally Hibbits, supra note 176, at 241.
178. Id. (quoting ASHELY S. LIPSON, ART OF ADVOCACY: DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE § 2.02
(1994)).
179. Of course, whether these films actually make the legal determinations clear or easy is
another question altogether, as the Rodney King incident and its aftermath powerfully shows.
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but they do show the plaintiff him or herself, captured on camera during
an ordinary day, showing the "real" plaintiff going about his or her
business. But more generally, filmic evidence lets the jury see matters for
itself; it turns the spectators into virtual witnesses.
Of course, these points elide a central question: Should the jury believe
what is before its eyes? Film as a medium simultaneously reflects a belief
in the primacy of the visual and challenges it. The experience of film
watching is affectively powerful, and this power comes, in part, out of
how genuine-seeming, how real, a film can seem. And yet a film is
directed, staged, edited, acted-it is an elaborate production, an artifice
that nonetheless feels real. As Siegfried Kracauer once famously claimed,
"what the camera captures seems more real than reality itself."' The
point, however, is that film as a medium plays to some of the significant
assumptions embedded within our rules of evidence, and it has the added
advantage of letting the jury see for itself.
Of course, it is precisely the way in which film seems real that makes it
simultaneously powerful and dangerous. Through the medium of film, the
real and the image can become so inextricably intertwined that jury
members watching a film may forget the present of the courtroom to enter
the past of the crime, or put aside their own identities to identify with an
imagined witness. At the same time, they may see the reenactment of a
crime or event as somehow more real than the original, and their viewing
of it as somehow more legitimate than a mere witness's account-more
real and more legitimate, that is, because of the heightened attention to the
subject a film can provide, because of the heightened opportunity to see
more carefully, more effectively, more conclusively. But despite these
dangers-reflected precisely in Wignore's warning as well as judicial
concerns about the spectacular-judges may have felt that films simply
could not be kept out. As a medium that gave the jury direct sense
perception of relevant matters, that let them see events for themselves, it
may have seemed too powerful, too persuasive, too appealing, to exclude.
CONCLUSION
This final argument, that films were an appealing form of evidence
precisely because they give the viewer such a powerful perception of
really being there, of witnessing, of approaching ground zero, takes us to
our concluding point: that there is in fact a significant affinity between the
filmed reenactment, as a cultural form, and what takes place in the
courtroom.
If, as Richard Sherwin has recently argued, the "symbolic drama"
played out by trials casts jurors into "a mythic space and time," where
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"ordinary conventions drop away together with the ingrained habits of
thought, feeling, and belief that maintain them," then surely the use of
filmic evidence plays a part in this casting.18 Sherwin's description of a
trial resembles, in fact, the ideal cinematic experience as constructed by
Hollywood. In both, the viewer is asked to leave the circumstances of her
own world behind in order to enter as fully as she can into the "virtual"
world before her. In both, she is invited to see much more attentively than
she does outside the perimeters of their spaces. In film, as in a trial, reality
becomes compelling, not because it is ordinary, but because it is suddenly
strange-because it invites the viewer to watch with an extra-ordinary
kind of attention.
While films and trials may have certain parallels, our claim is more
particular: that trials are in fact a kind of reenactment. In a filmed
reenactment like Northside, typically a singular, largely consistent version
of events unfolds on screen, ensuring that the audience, whether they sit in
a court of law or a theater, reads the evidence in a certain way. 82 By
contrast, within a trial, multiple reenactments of the past compete. Each
side offers its story, and the verdict is a judgment about which
reenactment is more persuasive. The verdict affirms one side's story as the
more plausible one, the one that bears a better correspondence to reality.
Moreover, as evidence scholar Charles Nesson has persuasively argued,
the verdict is not seen, in the end, as a comment on the strength or
weakness of the evidence; rather, it is taken to be a judgment about what
"really" happened.'83
The key point is that both reenactments like Northside and the stories
told at trials are, aspirationally, substitute depictions of what actually
occurred. The reenactment and the representations presented at a trial both
endeavor to stand in for the real. They do not do this through
misrepresentation: They do not claim to be a literal depiction of what
happened, but rather, acknowledge explicitly that they are retellings. They
do not give us direct access to ground zero, but they nonetheless give us
the essence of ground zero. The claim of a reenactment like Northside-
that which makes it a reenactment rather than just a fictional story inspired
by real events-is that it is true to the actual past in all the ways that
count. (Note that in this sense a reenactment's relation to the actual is, in
fact analogical: Like an analogy, the reenactment claims to correspond to
the real in the ways that matter, without professing an identity between the
reenactment and the event itself.) Similarly, an attorney making a closing
181. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP, supra note 19, at 50-51.
182. Of course, some films are in fact about the problem of perception and interpretation, and
generate multiple versions of events precisely to illustrate the incomplete nature of perception and the
fragility of memory: any list of such films would start with RASHOMON (Daiei 1950). For a thorough
analysis of Rashomon as a socio-legal text, see Kamir, supra note 19.
183. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1357 (1985).
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argument endeavors to make the factfinders feel that they know what must
have occurred even though they were not there. Reenactments and
representations at trials become, at least in part, our account of what
happened, even though we know that they do not give us transparent
access to the events themselves.l"4 In fact, if they fail to become substitute
depictions of the actual, they are failures in their own terms. The filmed
reenactment that strays too far from reality loses credibility; it becomes at
best, fiction, at worst misleading or propagandist.'85 The trial verdict that
cannot stand as a judgment about what actually happened can become a
social problem, leading to cynicism about legal process (think O.J.
Simpson) or in the extreme, unrest or riots (think Rodney King).
This excursion into films as evidence and the deep affinity between the
reenactment and the trial itself has taken us some distance away from
Northside itself. But it is worth nothing that Northside is itself a successful
reenactment ofjust such a failed trial. That is, Northside tells the story of a
verdict that in the end could not be believed as an account of what really
happened. By the end of the film, Wiecek's conviction cannot stand, for it
is no longer a plausible judgment about what actually occurred in that
speakeasy so many years before. Note, however, that Wiecek's conviction
does not simply collapse under its own weight: It takes an investigative
reporter's diligent effort to bring forth the evidence that shows the
mismatch between the verdict and reality. In this sense, Northside is an
unusual reenactment: It is not merely, or even primarily, the story of a
crime or the story of a trial. Rather, it is the story of the making of a story
out of the crime and the trial. It is a reenactment of the making of a
narrative, a narrative that revealed the original judgment of guilt to be
nothing more than fiction.
If Northside's starting point is a trial in which the verdict and reality
failed to correspond, as a reenactment the film largely succeeds. We do
not mean by this to make an aesthetic judgment, but rather a practical one:
Though Northside is not terribly well known, it seems nonetheless fair to
say that it is all that remains of the original story of Joseph Majczek's
wrongful conviction. The film has come to stand in for what really
happened, and, with the passage of time, even the fictional photograph
that the film uses to generate both a climax and evidentiary certainty has,
on occasion, been seen as real. For example, in an annual report in 1994, a
journalism foundation used Northside to illustrate the power of
photographic evidence in a pre-digital era-and in a delicious irony, given
184. The film Boomerang makes this point explicitly. The reenactments within the film show the
film's viewers all that they can ever know about what really happened-which is mostly that they
cannot really know what happened. The film shies away from its epistemological skepticism, however,
by implicitly (and unfortunately) giving the viewers an alternative (and never fully proven) theory of
the crime.
185. This is precisely the debate, for example, over some of Oliver Stone's films, such as NIXON
(Hollywood Pictures 1995), or JFK (Warner Brothers 1991).
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that it was, after all, a report on the future of journalism, simply assumed
that the photograph had really existed:
In the 1948 film Call Northside 777, Jimmy Stewart obtained an
innocent man's freedom from prison by means of the latest
technological advance-the Associated Press Wirephoto.... In real
life, Chicago Times reporter James McGuire received a Pulitzer Prize
for the reporting on which the movie was based. His hard work-his
clever use of the latest technology-succeeded in freeing the unjustly
convicted Joe Majczek from prison, where he had served 11 years for
a crime he didn't commit.
In the 1940s, modern technology performed the miracle of
transmitting irrefutable photographic evidence almost instantaneously
from one location to another. In the 1990s, technology has made it
possible for all existing means by which information is imparted
from one human being to another-sounds, images, printed words-
to be converted into digital form-the Os and Is used by
computers.... Would the photo McGuire used to prove Majczek's
innocence prove anything at all anymore?186
We ought not to overinterpret an annual report. But still, this example
shows how, especially with the passage of time, the reenactment can
indeed become the real thing, or at least, all that remains of it.
Creating a believable story of the past is the raison-d'6tre of
reenactments and trials alike. Both the stories told at trials and those told
in reenactments like Northside admittedly provide only a partial,
subjective, mediated, and even fictional account of what occurred. They
cannot and do not claim truth in any grand sense, but their purpose is truth
nonetheless: Both verdicts and reenactments attempt to capture the past in
the ways that matter most. Recognizing this affinity between the trial and
the reenacted film provides one final reason for why judges were reluctant
to engage in a sustained critique of film as evidence: Perhaps such a
critique would lead to a reflective examination of the trial process itself,
exposing the theater of proof as, well, theater.
186. The ROBERT R. MCCORMICK TRIBUNE FOUND., 1994 (JOURNALISM PROGRAM), available at
http://rrmtf.org/journalism/j94ar.htm. Note also that McGuire did not in fact receive a Pulitzer for his
reporting on Majczek, though he did receive several other awards. See supra note 13.
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